Tu-95. Source: Izvestia/Pavel Bednyakov Written by  Ilya Kramnik ; Originally appeared at  Izvestia The 2011-2020 State Armaments Program (SAP) implementation is approaching the end. In some instances, it will be completely or almost completely fulfilled, in some others there is a big gap between the implementation and the plan. Soon the Russian military will start receiving weapons under the newly reapproved 2018-2027 SAP. Izvestia attempts to assess its key provisions. Strategic Clarity The strategic component of SAP provokes the fewest questions. Modernization of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) remains a priority irrespective of situation, and the current political situation can only magnify its importance. It is evident that the SNF will continue to acquire Yars ICBMs in a mobile configuration, replacing the aging Soviet-era Topols. The deployment of silo-based Sarmat replacing the Voyevoda is expected in 2021. 2019 will see the deployment of the Avangard gliding hyper

Written by  J.Hawk  exclusively for  SouthFront Introduction Venezuela has the dubious fortune of being located on the continent of South America, which the United States has treated under the so-called “Monroe Doctrine” as its exclusive zone of political, economic, and military influence. In practical terms it meant that whenever a Latin American government pursued a policy at odds with Washington’s preferences, it would be subjected to measures ranging from economic sanctions to outright military invasion. Latin America became one of the many battlefields of the Cold War when several countries sought to leave the US shadow and align themselves with USSR. The US retaliation was harsh, and included the support for the brutal military coup in Chile, training of “death squads” in Honduras and El Salvador, support for the so-called Contras in Nicaragua, not to mention the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Once the Cold War was over, however, a relative peace settle