Summary
GALI TIBBON/AFP/Getty Image
Egyptian Ambassador to Israel Atef Salem (L) meets with Israeli President Shimon Peres in Jerusalem on Oct. 17
Israeli military action will have significant consequences for Egypt. Cairo traditionally has been the primary regional power, and its peace treaty with Israel has been central to Israel's national defense strategy. However, the Arab Spring and subsequent rise to power of the Islamists in Cairo has upended Egypt's internal political calculation. Conflict in Gaza puts the Muslim Brotherhood in a very awkward position. What happens next depends upon how Israel decides to proceed in Gaza.
Analysis
Egypt announced Nov. 14 that it was recalling its ambassador to Israel. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood called on the government to reassess the country's relationship with Israel after a series of Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip that included the assassination of a senior Hamas military leader. The Muslim Brotherhood's political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, called for a swift Arab and international response. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry also issued a statement condemning the airstrikes and warning that they could negatively affect regional stability.
The statements from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and the Brotherhood signal a nonbelligerent response to the Israeli operations. Under former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt typically issued such nonthreatening responses to Israeli military operations in Gaza. While rhetoric does not always reflect reality, the statements emerging from Cairo suggest Egypt is not looking for a fight with Israel.
Even so, Egypt's new Islamist-led government has substantially less room to maneuver with its Muslim Brotherhood supporters and Egyptians at large than Mubarak had. Morsi previously led the Muslim Brotherhood. Although he has since resigned from the group, he is still not a wholly independent actor, and his policies largely reflect Muslim Brotherhood policy positions. Egyptians overall feel an intimate link to the Palestinians when the latter are under attack by Israel, even if Egyptians often are suspicious of the Palestinians. And anti-Israeli (and anti-U.S.) sentiment runs deep in Egypt. Egypt has fought three wars with Israel, and though the majority or Egyptians alive today do not remember those conflicts firsthand, many retain their parents' anger and frustration toward Israel. They largely view the state of Israel as illegitimate, unjust and unfairly backed by the world's only superpower. They also resent its military prowess, economic development and regional power.
Like most Islamist groups in the region, the Muslim Brotherhood has long capitalized on that sentiment. But it has done it in a calculated way. It does not want to go too far and risk a crisis with Israel, an estrangement from the United States or even a mass rising against the peace treaty. Since coming to power, Egypt's Islamists have hinted at reviewing the Camp David Accords. They also have had the opportunity to address their long-standing goal of altering the Egyptian force structure on the Sinai Peninsula. Rising jihadist activity in Sinai has given the Egyptians an excuse to expand their military presence there.
Israel, like the United States, is uncomfortable with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and does not know where Morsi plans to take the country. The Muslim Brotherhood's longer-term strategic plans include positioning Egypt as the region's leading Islamist power. But thus far, Cairo has done little to change its relationship with Israel and has said it would not abrogate the treaty. And regardless of Morsi's background, he is the president of a country that faces many constraints and has little to gain from a conflict with Israel. Still, the Muslim Brotherhood -- which is likely to score a substantial majority in legislative polls expected early next year -- will likely dominate the government for years to come and will continue to pursue an Islamist agenda.
An Israeli offensive in Gaza would add enormous pressure on the Brotherhood. It would distract it from its goal of taking over the legislature and solidifying its position in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood faces competition from a spectrum of other Islamists, including a radical Salafist segment that has wide appeal among poor Egyptian Muslims. But the Salafists are fragmented, offering the Muslim Brotherhood the chance to pick up some of the 28 percent of the vote the Salafists won in the last election.
To do so, the Muslim Brotherhood will need to burnish its Islamist credentials, something a moderate response to Israeli action in Gaza will undercut -- especially if the Israeli intervention extends for a long period of time. In a further complication for the Muslim Brotherhood, disagreement within the government over how to respond has the potential to create its own crisis for Morsi's still-new government, by extension provoking a crisis within the Brotherhood.
Conflict in Gaza also could trigger operations by actors outside Cairo's control. The military, currently neutralized on the political realm, might not be content to watch from the sidelines as events unfold in Gaza. Jihadists in Sinai might also seek to exploit conflict to revive their own activities. The jihadists would be likely to find greater cooperation from the Sinai Peninsula's tribes, and perhaps even from within the Egyptian military, if their operations targeted Israel.
Egypt and Hamas will coordinate their response to Israel to some extent. Egypt has no choice but to coordinate with Hamas at least with regard to the border. Still, the two sides' interests are not fully aligned and could diverge further under the stresses emerging from this situation. Hamas would not want to alienate the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo at this point, something that would be tantamount to suicide. For its part, Egypt is not going to abandon Hamas, though it may shut down the Rafah border crossing or at least clamp down on smuggling into Gaza through tunnels under the border. What happens next, of course, depends upon whether the Israelis in fact are planning a ground operation, and if they are, how extensive that would be.
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