The brief 2012 Second Gaza War was largely a "push-button war" between Palestinian rocket teams hidden in bunkers and tunnels, and Israeli operators in command shelters and Israeli pilots delivering precision-guided munitions, said Uzi Rubin of the Rubicon defence technology consulting organisation during a presentation to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in Washington, DC, on 18 December 2012. The ground forces had remained on the sidelines in what might be a glimpse of the shape of future wars, he suggested.
1155585An Israeli photographer captured this view of four incoming rockets during the 2008 war against Hizbullah. Israeli analyst Uzi Rubin believes that this sort of push-button war fought with missiles and precision-guided munitions could become common. (Israeli Police)
Prospective Gulf conflicts with Iran might unfold along similar lines of static "push-button wars", he believed. Active and passive defence of population centres, national infrastructures and military forces might prove crucial if the United States and its allies were to prevail in such conflicts.
During the 2012 conflict, Palestinian rocket teams achieved the highest rate of fire of recent campaigns, launching an average of 215 rockets per day, and targeting around 32% of these against built-up areas. By comparison, the rate of fire during the December to January 2009 conflict was 33 rockets per day, and around 30% aimed at built-up areas. During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Hezbollah rocket teams had fired an average of 127 rockets per day, around 25% against built-up areas.
In 2006, Israel's only defence measures against rocket attack had been passive, and Hizbullah had achieved one Israeli fatality for every 75 rockets fired. In 2012, with Iron Dome in service, each fatality had required the firing of an average of 300 Palestinian rockets.
In the latest conflict, Palestinian rocket teams have targeted (in order of priority) population centres, military installations, and troop concentrations. Despite the risk of damaging Moslem and Christian holy places, they had targeted the Jerusalem urban area.
They had demonstrated a nascent ability to shift aim points and engage targets of opportunity, said Rubin, and had used saturation attacks, depressed trajectories, and, perhaps, bursts of recurring salvoes in attempts to counter Israel's Iron Dome defence system.
Despite the intense Israeli counter-fire, the rocket teams had demonstrated the capability to maintain command and control, and even to conduct a "photo finish" final burst of fire.
According to Rubin, the locally made M-75 rocket that made its debut during the conflict may have been Iranian designed. He cited a launch weight of perhaps 200 kg, a warhead that may have weighed 80 kg, and a maximum range that could extend to 80 km.
Four Iron Dome batteries were deployed in the urban zones of Ashdod, Ashkelon, Beer Sheva, and Netivot/Ofakim, and were later joined by a fifth battery tasked with defending the urban zone of Tel Aviv. Throughout the conflict, the Jerusalem urban zone remained undefended.
Iron Dome successfully engaged and destroyed rockets from both ends of the spectrum of specified threats (4-70 km), and according to Yair Ramati, the director of the Israel Missile Defence Organisation, the system had overcome all attempted Palestinian counter tactics.
The five batteries destroyed 421 rockets of various types, 84% of the engaged threats. As a result, only 58 rocket impacts occurred within built up areas. According to Ehud Barak, Israel's minister of defence, about 500 interceptors were fired, giving an exchange ratio of 1.2 interceptors per destroyed rocket, although other sources have quoted a higher ratio of 1.4. "This is a significant improvement over the exchange ratio of 2.2 achieved in the March 2012 round of fighting," said Rubin.
The cost of the expended interceptors came to about USD25 million, an affordable sum in Israeli terms and a fraction of the total cost of the conflict, he stated.
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