Summary
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos faces two challenges in ongoing peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also known as the FARC. Democratic Center, a conservative political party led by former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, has remained consistently opposed to any negotiations with militants and is gaining political ground ahead of legislative and presidential elections in 2014. A rise in FARC attacks against energy infrastructure also threatens to further reduce public support for the talks.
To safeguard the talks and possibly avoid a political defeat, Santos will likely try to speed up progress toward a preliminary peace deal with the rebels before the election. The FARC will continue to use attacks as leverage but not to the point that it severely undermines the talks. If the government can show progress in the negotiations, such as a partial peace deal, before the elections, it would ensure future support for an eventual agreement regardless of whether Santos is re-elected.
Analysis
The peace negotiations with the FARC recently entered a crucial stage. Rebel delegates and the government have been discussing the nature of future political participation for the FARC since the 11th round of talks began in July 2013. During this stage, the Colombian government will have to make difficult concessions to keep the militants in the talks, such as potentially granting the FARC seats in Congress and determining whether legal amnesty should be issued to rebel leaders. Political concessions to the FARC are necessary to dissuade the group from continuing politically motivated attacks, but such concessions are also controversial. Democratic Center has capitalized, leveling criticisms against the government that have helped it gain ground in the polls ahead of legislative elections in March 2014 and the presidential election in May 2014.
The elections are essentially a hard deadline for the peace negotiations because there is considerable opposition to dealing with the FARC. If Santos can make significant progress in the talks before the elections, he can potentially get the country close enough to a deal that even a strong opposition party would not be able to walk away from them. In the absence of such progress, Santos may not be able to secure re-election, which would put the talks in question.
Dispatch
FARC-Colombia Peace Negotiations (Dispatch)
There are several sources of political opposition that may step forward to challenge Santos directly, but the most dynamic is the party led by Uribe, the ex-president and a former ally of Santos. Uribe founded and leads the Democratic Center, whose rising popularity has been demonstrated in recent polls. In a September 2013 poll, 49 percent of respondents said they would vote for Democratic Center in the legislative elections, compared to 20 percent for all other candidates. Thirty-one percent of voters remained undecided or said they would not vote, which offers Santos some political leeway.
Democratic Center does not yet have a presidential candidate, and much of its popularity is likely due to its opposition to talks with the FARC and its association with the popular Uribe. However, Santos' public approval has also suffered due to several incidents in 2013, including agricultural protests against government policies and a maritime border dispute with Nicaragua. The same September poll showed that a majority of Colombians oppose the president's re-election, and the recent spike in FARC activity could further erode his popularity.
Colombia and Nicaragua's Maritime Dispute Intensifies
During the first weeks of October, the FARC increased the pace of attacks against energy, mining and electricity infrastructure throughout Colombia. Militants struck oil and natural gas pipelines and electricity transmission towers and derailed a train carrying coal from the Cerrejon coal mine. At least five attacks on pipelines were reported, including one Oct. 9 against the Antonio Ricaurte binational natural gas pipeline, which supplies natural gas to western Venezuela. The FARC has also carried out two attacks with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. Individually, these attacks are not exceptional -- action against the targets is well within the FARC's existing capabilities -- but the pace and timing of the attacks is notable; the FARC could be trying to pressure the Santos administration to reach an agreement on the group's future political participation.
However, pressure through militant attacks may further reduce the public's support for a deal reintegrating the FARC into domestic politics. Despite majority support for peace talks, citizens' backing for the already proposed political integration initiatives remains low. A September poll showed that most Colombians do not favor amnesty for militant leaders, nor do they back congressional positions for former rebels. Still, 39 percent of respondents continue to favor a negotiated political solution with the FARC. This number -- which is seven percentage points higher than those who favor defeating the FARC on the battlefield -- may drop if the government faces a prolonged FARC offensive without a peace deal. Dissatisfied voters could swing to Democratic Center, and this fact will influence the government's future steps in negotiations.
Because of pressure from the FARC and its concern over Democratic Center, the Santos administration will most likely accelerate the resolution of the second point of negotiations. The government will probably not reach its goal of peace by November, and Santos knows that the longer he goes without a peace deal, the more electoral support for Uribe's party will rise.
Comments
Post a Comment