Summary
The two U.S. special operations raids to capture high-value targets in Libya and Somalia both occurred on Oct. 5 but do not seem to have been directly connected. The operations were most likely the consequences of distinct intelligence efforts, and their timing so close together was probably coincidental. Still, the operations illustrate that while the United States is avoiding larger and longer engagements, the use of limited special operations with smaller dispersed footprints and specific targets continues.
Analysis
The target of the operation in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, was Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, also known as Abu Anas al-Libi. He has been sought by the United States for his involvement in the 1998 embassy attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and was one of the original names on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists list when it was created in October 2001. Apart from his role in the embassy attacks, al-Libi had been tied to the al Qaeda core since its relocation to Sudan in 1994, having operated close to Osama bin Laden. That Washington has a solid legal case against al-Libi made his capture a more attractive option than killing him with a drone strike in a populated city.
After the 1998 attacks in East Africa, al-Libi lived in the United Kingdom for some time, where he avoided prosecution due to a lack of evidence. He finally fled to Afghanistan in 2000 before law enforcement teams raided his house. After the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, al-Libi allegedly escaped to Iran, only to return to Libya in 2010, prior to the Libyan civil war that led to the end of Moammar Gadhafi's rule. Al-Libi likely took advantage of the amnesty offered to jihadists by the Gadhafi regime, managed by the former dictator's son, Seif al-Islam.
Al-Libi has been known to associate with several organizations that were involved in Libya's civil war, although he did not seem to be involved in al Qaeda in East Africa's operations. Given U.S. activities in Libya, especially increased intelligence gathering after the September 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, al-Libi had probably been under surveillance. With the decimation of the core al Qaeda group, al-Libi was likely trying to either stay below the radar in Libya, or to pursue his jihadist ambitions to the extent possible, especially with the opportunities provided in post-Gadhafi Libya. He was probably still attempting to establish an operational base by navigating the local militia landscape. That he got caught suggests that he failed to develop an infrastructure or to latch on to an existing one. This should not be a surprise since the scale of jihadism in Libya is much smaller than in other places.
A separate, failed raid took place earlier Oct. 5 in the coastal Somali town of Baraawe, which is still under the control of al Shabaab. The raid targeted Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir, commonly known as Ikrima, a leader of Kenyan terrorist group al-Hijra, also known as the Muslim Youth Center. The group is affiliated with al Shabaab, having openly pledged allegiance to them, and has been implicated in a series of bombings in Nairobi as well as the recruitment of youths in Kenya to join al Shabaab in Somalia.
The attempt to capture Ikrima came two weeks after the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, an attack that involved both al Shabaab and al-Hijra. Ikrima allegedly arranged safe houses and equipment for the militants who attacked the mall. His capture would have removed an important operative from al-Hijra, disrupting the group's ability to plan attacks in Kenya, while also eliminating an important backer of Ahmad Abdi Godane's transnationalist faction within al Shabaab. The consolidation of al Shabaab's leadership after Godane's attempts to weed out opponents has resulted in a stricter hierarchy that could be easier to disrupt. The capture of Ikrima could also have delivered useful intelligence on the whereabouts or activities of other important al Shabaab militants.
Both targets have indirect or past links to the al Qaeda in East Africa network, but their activities have never been directly connected, and it is unlikely that the raids, despite occurring on the same day, were related. It is more likely that the raids occurred together because of the availability of intelligence and operational constraints.
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