Summary
The timing of a North Korean delegation's visit to Iran for "friendship week" suggests that more than just a cultural exchange is taking place. The apparent U.S.-Russia agreement on Syria and the early steps toward dialogue between Washington and Tehran can help Pyongyang gauge any possible rapprochement with the United States. They also emphasize how differently North Korea formulates its strategy to deal with Washington.
Analysis
Under the auspice of the DPRK-Iran Friendship Association, North Korea and Iran mark friendship weeks nearly every year, but these usually come earlier in the year, between February and June. They also typically involve Iranian diplomats who are already stationed in North Korea, not North Korean delegations traveling to Iran. North Korean Labor Minister Jong Yong Su, the head of the association since 2005, has long-established relations with Tehran, and these ties may allow for a more candid dialogue between the two states -- a prospect made more likely by the casual and public nature of the visit.
North Korea, which former U.S. President George W. Bush deemed part of the "Axis of Evil" with Iran and Iraq, has a long history of military cooperation with Iran, particularly in the development of missiles, but also by some accounts in at least some parts of nuclear weapons technology. In fact, there have been reports that Iranian scientists were present in North Korea for its nuclear tests, and North Korean scientists have been present in Iran for Iranian space launches. North Korea also has a history of military technology and equipment transfers to Syria, an erstwhile Iranian ally that is currently in the throes of a civil war and allowing the international community to inspect its chemical weapons stockpiles.
North Korean leaders certainly are concerned about the implications of the apparent U.S.-Russian deal on Syria -- something Iran should have additional information on -- and the tentative new dialogue between Iran and the United States. Pyongyang has a two-fold interest in these developments: First, it is concerned that this newfound cooperation could compromise information about its own weapons development and sales. Even if such information does not get leaked, North Korea is worried that this cooperation could affect its revenue stream, not to mention the technical information it obtains from its defense relationships.
The second concern is with the actual form and pace of negotiations with the United States. On the one hand, Pyongyang is interested to learn what sorts of concessions Washington may be willing to make to resolve disagreements with Iran. In turn, this could inform North Korea's diplomatic strategy. On the other hand, Pyongyang wants to understand just how serious the potential rapprochement is, how fast it could advance and whether it would leave North Korea even further isolated internationally.
A Different Position
North Korea does not coordinate its U.S. diplomatic strategy with Iran, but the two allies have played off of each another's actions in the past. Pyongyang is just as interested as everyone else in the type, speed and likelihood of any new U.S.-Iran understanding. However, North Korea recognizes that its international position differs greatly from Iran's, and thus its interests and prospects for revised ties with Washington likewise differ.
Unlike Iran, North Korea does not have large quantities of coveted natural resources. It does not have a large or influential network in a critical region of the world, nor has it ever been a major regional power. North Korea's very existence as a nation stems from competition in the early days of the Cold War. Its long-term security requires unification with the South, but any attempt to unify would threaten the North Korean elite's hold on power.
North Korean leaders are motivated by regime preservation, which shapes their thinking on ancillary issues. But regime preservation does not necessarily mean the country must be an international pariah. Rather, Pyongyang's strategy, which began to emerge in the latter days of the Kim Jong Il regime and has expanded in the early days of Kim Jong Un's leadership, is to use a strong military deterrent to provide the space for slow shifts in economic and diplomatic actions.
Signs of Economic Reform in North Korea
Kim Jong Un has articulated the strategy as one of pursuing both the nuclear deterrent and economic reformation. On the surface, seeking both guns and butter appears contradictory, given that the world will withhold the butter so long as there are guns. But North Korea's views have been shaped particularly strongly by its observations of Libya, a country that gave up its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Libya was accepted by the West and had natural resources to exploit, and then it saw its leadership ousted by a combination of internal upheaval and U.S. and European intervention. The lesson taken in Pyongyang is that economic reform and opening without a strong deterrent leaves it vulnerable to exploitation and betrayal by the West. Even China did not pursue its economic opening until it was well established as a nuclear state -- and China was bigger and older and had more potential than small North Korea.
This is not to say that North Korea does not want to amend its relations United States. Pyongyang will need more than just Chinese investment -- especially when that investment is meant to serve Chinese interests rather than enhance North Korean productivity more broadly. It will also need more than a joint economic zone with South Korea to turn its economy around. And without economic change, the regime itself is at risk. The tenuous balance among the elites in North Korea is maintained through power and economic access, and social order is maintained in part through control of resources.
The North Korean government may not be on the brink of collapse; the severity of its economic and social situation has often been exaggerated abroad. However, its leadership clearly recognizes that it cannot continue along the same path, and the handouts from China are coming with more conditions and less room for the North to retain a sense of national independence. If there is one country North Korea worries about more than the United States, which perhaps is more a distant worry designed to shape popular impressions, it is China, the massive neighbor with a history of asserting its own interests over the Koreans. Even small amounts of economic change in North Korea that begin attracting trade and investment from countries other than China, South Korea or Japan would go a long way toward expanding North Korea's policy options.
But any significant change in international perceptions requires a change in the relationship between North Korea and the United States. Few countries are interested in placing any significant investments at risk of U.S. sanctions, particularly when North Korea has so little to offer. There are some mineral resources and coal available in the North, not to mention cheap labor, but the labor pool is relatively small, and the infrastructure needed to access the resources may exceed their overall value, particularly given the level of political risk. Even if an agreement can be reached with Washington, there is little to guarantee the longevity of a new understanding yet plenty of uncertainty surrounding the possibility of an externally instigated popular uprising. In any case, North Korea would still remain constrained by its location and continued division from the South.
North Korea's leaders, then, are watching the U.S. moves with Iran very closely. If Washington appears ready to make real concessions to Iran simply to end the long-standing hostilities and reshape the dynamics of the Middle East, there may be some opportunity for the North to try to capitalize on the momentum, though it would still maintain a strong military as it softens the more immediate sense of hostility with the United States. Even short of a formal diplomatic understanding, this could provide enough room for some investors to decide the political risk is low enough to put money into North Korean infrastructure, at least as a way to make money off of the country's potential role as a link in regional trade routes, or simply to expand the Kaesong model to invite others to use North Korea's competitive labor pricing.
But North Korea remains tied up in the larger regional dynamic, in the competition between China and Japan, the United States and China, and in China's expanding regional role. North Korea's long-term security rests not in a possible temporary understanding with the United States but in its ability to reunify with South Korea. A deal with the United States, or some European money invested in rail and electricity, would still leave Pyongyang far shy of its ultimate goal. It could even provoke China to apply more pressure.
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