Summary
The United States continues to face obstacles in its policy of "pivoting" toward the Asia-Pacific. On Oct. 2, the White House canceled President Barack Obama's visit to Malaysia and the Philippines, slated to take place Oct. 11-12, citing "logistical" difficulties as a result of the partial federal government shutdown. Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman will travel in his stead, while Obama himself will not travel to these countries until a later unspecified date. So far, Obama is still expected to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bali and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders' meeting and East Asia Summit in Brunei from October 7-10, where heads of government will meet. But further cancellations cannot be ruled out.
Analysis
The cancellation points to Washington's continued trouble finding the capacity to maintain its pivot policy. First, the pivot remains constrained by ongoing, heavy U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Despite withdrawing from Iraq and the approaching withdrawal from Afghanistan, the attempt to engineer a rapprochement with Iran while managing relations with allies Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as the effort to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons, points to the region's continuing draw on American diplomacy.
In addition, diplomatic efforts to Asia have repeatedly fallen victim to domestic interference. In March 2010 Obama delayed and then canceled a trip to Indonesia and Australia in order to focus on pushing the Affordable Care Act through Congress. In June that year, he canceled the replacement trip as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Now Malaysia and the Philippines join the list. Presidential visits are especially important for achieving overarching strategic objectives as opposed to technical arrangements handled by lower-level negotiators.
Obama's trip was intended to demonstrate the broad importance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. prosperity and security, but two items stand out in Obama's agenda for these trips. First, in the Philippines, Obama hoped to complete a deal to allow greater flexibility for the U.S. military to rotate into and operate out of Philippine bases. The U.S. lost its permanent bases in the Philippines in 1992, and since 1999 has operated on the basis of a Visiting Forces Agreement. With the changing security environment in the region, especially as a result of growing tensions over the South China Sea, the U.S. and the Philippines have sought to revive the defense alliance. This visit would have provided a diplomatic boost to that effort.
Second, in Malaysia, Obama would have had the opportunity to speak with Prime Minister Najib Razak about ongoing negotiations for the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. Opposition to the trade deal has grown in recent months over its premise of raising international trade deals to a new level by covering areas like government procurement, intellectual property, state-owned enterprises and labor and environmental regulations. Moreover, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has spearheaded this opposition, forcing Najib, who is facing internal party elections later this month, to make sure that his administration treads carefully in addressing the concerns of various interest groups.
As the Malaysian ruling coalition struggles to ensure it maintains its decades-old political dominance in the face of an increasingly robust opposition movement, the prospect of sacrificing any leverage over state companies and government contracts becomes more difficult politically. Had Obama gone to Kuala Lumpur as scheduled on Oct. 11, he may have faced protests that were taking shape from non-governmental organizations and others. But he would have countered the opposition with a demonstration of commitment, especially given that he would have been the first U.S. president to visit Malaysia in over forty years.
Malaysia is also a critical country in ASEAN with regards to the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which aims to prevent territorial grabs and the use of force. If the United States can encourage Malaysia to take a firm stand on territorial disputes, given that Kuala Lumpur has largely avoided discord with China on the issue, it will go a long way in strengthening ASEAN unity on the issue.
Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping will move forward with his trip to Malaysia on Oct. 3-5. Beginning in 2009, China also has sought to revive relations with Malaysia, both for its economic vibrancy and its strategic location at the juncture of peninsular and insular Southeast Asia. China is notably excluded from the TPP talks, yet has the ability to offer large investments to match Malaysia's development plans without special conditions regarding how Malaysia governs its state-owned enterprises or how it parcels out government contracts. China also hopes to encourage a sympathetic Malaysia in talks with the rest of ASEAN over a Code of Conduct, so as to drive a wedge between the bloc's members and improve Beijing's bargaining position.
With both China and the United States courting Malaysia, Xi's visit will contrast with Obama's absence, although the cancellations are not likely to jeopardize these policies in the long run. True, Obama's absence sends a negative signal to Malaysia over the TPP negotiations, which could conceivably delay the resolution of outstanding differences on the trade deal. But it seems unlikely that Malaysia's hesitations and domestic debate will prevent it from ultimately agreeing to the trade agreement. Malaysia is fully integrated into the regional and global economy, where it is highly competitive and has trade deals with most of the TPP partners already, and it wants more access to American markets to achieve its goal of becoming a developed economy.
In the Philippines, Obama's visit would have helped generate political momentum for the controversial effort to revive a U.S. military presence there. But again, the Philippines' security concerns, especially its lack of capabilities for dealing with China over island disputes, are driving the movement to enhance that presence just as much as American concerns, and President Benigno Aquino's administration has the public support to make a deal.
But repeated delays in the long run could undermine the region's sense of American reliability, giving Southeast Asian states pause in deciding whether it is worthwhile to try and stand up to China's encroachments when they simultaneously need to maintain strong economic ties with China. So the longer the United States allows the perception of incapacity to build around its pivot, the more these countries will have to reconsider and reshape policies.
With the U.S. pivot developing haltingly, it becomes especially important for the United States to see allies like Japan and Australia become frontrunners of regional policy and efforts to deepen engagement with ASEAN. Japan in particular is attempting a broad-based national revitalization, which includes not only broadening its participation in international trade agreements like the TPP but also in renewing direct diplomatic, economic and security outreach to Southeast Asia. Not only has Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched a diplomatic agenda with each ASEAN member, he intends to host an ASEAN summit in Tokyo later this year. For Japan, the goal is to rebuild its national prestige by renovating existing ties, based primarily on aid and investment, while responding to uncertainties and fears regarding China's rise. This requires seeking regional approval (tacit or otherwise) for normalizing its military role, which it presents as internationalist and humanitarian in intent.
Thus while Obama's cancellation signals that the United States still lacks the capacity to make its pivot a resounding success, the pivot will nevertheless continue to develop because it arises not only from American interests but from those of the Southeast Asian states, which hope to take advantage of American economic and military strength. Japan, with its own reservoir of national power, has the potential to reinforce this U.S.-ASEAN engagement as it struggles to take off -- not because Japan wishes to do Washington's bidding, but because its own need for growth and security drive it to recognize a shared cause in setting up more durable links with Southeast Asia.
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