Summary
The temporary abduction of Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan is the latest manifestation of the country's deteriorating security environment and the central government's inability to control the hundreds of thousands of armed revolutionaries, militiamen and Islamist militants in the country. But his kidnapping, which was reportedly conducted by government-aligned militia forces, is more a symptom of intra-governmental political competition than it is of unchecked violence and lawlessness.
Analysis
The Libyan government has confirmed that armed men, who are suspected revolutionaries, removed Zeidan from his Tripoli residence and held him against his will for several hours before releasing him unharmed Oct. 10. The prime minister was not injured in the incident and was reportedly held inside the Interior Ministry's offices.
There are conflicting reports that his abduction might have been an attempted arrest. In any case, the incident represents the second serious challenge to the Cabinet's authority by government-aligned armed groups since the constitutional drafting process was announced in July. In August, regional Petroleum Facility Guards began a strike at an export facility in eastern Libya that quickly spread throughout Cyrenaica, halting more than 50 percent of the country's oil production and exports and straining the central government's finances.
Zeidan's detention came shortly after the United States' capture of al Qaeda member Abu Anas al-Libi. U.S. Special Forces arrested al-Libi on Oct. 6 and moved him to a U.S. naval vessel in the Mediterranean, where is he currently awaiting trial. But despite the widespread acceptance of militia fighters and Islamist militants in Libyan society, especially in the eastern part of the country, al-Libi's arrest has spurred little reaction from Libyan militants. Maintaining a relatively low profile during and after the 2011 Libyan civil war, al-Libi does not appear to have been a high-ranking or well-connected member of Libyan Islamist or militant circles.
Instead, it seems that Zeidan's political opponents encouraged members of the Tripoli Special Operations Room, a grouping of state and militia security forces organized under the Interior Ministry to help maintain law and order in and around the capital, to arrest the prime minister. Political infighting, not anarchy, is what prompted these men to seize Zeidan. The prime minister's arrest has sent a powerful message about the weakness of his current position.
Dwindling Support
Western-backed and educated, Zeidan was a human rights lawyer working in Geneva prior to returning to participate in Libya's post-Gadhafi political process. In the past year, Tripoli's ability to project influence and security over the country has collapsed, and Zeidan and his political allies within the General National Congress have faced repeated political attacks. This opposition has come from a growing body of support for Muslim Brotherhood-led Islamists in the General National Congress and a growing coalition including federalists from eastern Libya, smaller regional governments, Islamists and the country's powerful militia forces opposing what they believe is Western-backed power consolidation by Zeidan and his allies -- in short, a return to Gadhafi-style rule.
Though Zeidan has appealed for calm, it is clear that his political support base is dwindling throughout the country and within his government. This has been reflected in the monthslong production halts in the country's vital hydrocarbons sector and in ongoing security lapses across much of the country. But while Zeidan's seizure marks a change in the political opposition's tactics to undermine his authority, there remains good reason to believe that he will not easily step down. Indeed, it does not appear that his Western backers -- primarily NATO states and their respective energy firms -- are ready to abandon him either by encouraging new elections or by negotiating oil and natural gas deals directly with local governments.
However, the longer production disruptions last, the more pressure foreign energy companies like Italy's ENI will face as they attempt to work through an ineffective central government and avoid dealing with local regional councils such as Benghazi. Foreign companies will have to balance the economic risks of working through Tripoli against the implications of empowering local governments, some of which have substantial Islamist and militant backing. This will limit the extent to which foreign companies start bypassing Tripoli and start making payments to local councils directly.
More Violence
Zeidan has been almost defiant in resisting militia and regional opposition to his authority, leading to long -- yet rarely violent -- standoffs between Libya's weak national military and security forces and the country's powerful and well-armed militias. His inability to negotiate over eastern demands has led to a precipitous decline in Libyan oil production and exports. But although Zeidan is unlikely to leave office on his own in the coming weeks, he is restrained than Gadhafi was in his ability to crush political opposition through force. The opposition may attempt a motion of no confidence against the prime minister. Otherwise, the current political stalemate can continue, with little end in sight for either the country's hydrocarbon production fluctuations or the security vacuum across much of Libyan territory. Even Zeidan's departure probably would not bring long-term stability to Libya; little else unites the opposition, a disparate group of competing ideologies and strategic imperatives, other than their aversion to Zeidan.
Zeidan's capture indicates the long-term trajectory of Libya's future: With little hope for internal coherence and stability, shows of force like Zeidan's seizure likely will beget more violence. Though Zeidan's removal from office probably would not spur large-scale public unrest or fighting between regions -- the General National Congress has already seen a prime minister and president removed through political means -- the ongoing weakening of the central political body does not bode well for Libyan stability. With a quickly deteriorating central state, Libya will fail to create a mechanism or leadership body capable of guaranteeing stable oil production or exports, further straining an economic model that has kept Libya's loosely affiliated interests from a full-scale civil war since Gadhafi's ouster. The effects are unlikely to remain within Libya's borders. The country's North African and regional neighbors will continue to face the challenges brought on by Libya's security vacuum.
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