Boat-borne IED attack on Yemeni LNG terminal signals intent but low capability to penetrate security

Yemen




Yemeni naval forces fired upon and destroyed a suspicious boat that was approaching a Yemen liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at Balhaf, Shabwah governorate, on 20 November 2013.

Military officials told local media sources that the boat had come from international waters, and was detected and intercepted as it passed through the maritime security perimeter around Balhaf. The vessel is likely to have been destroyed to guard against the risk of a boat-borne improvised explosive device (BBIED), a tactic previously used successfully by jihadists in Yemen in the early 2000s, most notably against the USS Cole in Aden in October 2000.

Balhaf has been repeatedly targeted in recent months by suspected Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants using IEDs and vehicle-borne VBIEDs. In June, a suicide bomber used a VBIED against the main gate of the facility, killing several soldiers but failing to penetrate the compound. More recently, on 23 September, AQAP militants wearing military uniforms used VBIEDs to attack three military posts near the terminal. There have also been regular incidents of militants targeting security personnel guarding the terminal, with eight soldiers killed by gunmen on 18 November.



Both the land and marine approaches to Balhaf are heavily protected by the Yemeni military due to the facility's critical national importance, reducing the likelihood of any VBIED or BBIED penetrating perimeter security and inflicting structural damage. A successful onshore attack would be likely to require inside assistance from security personnel. BBIED attacks are more likely to be successful if launched via hard-hulled boats from proper harbours, rather than dinghies off beaches. IHS is not currently aware of any harbours under jihadist control. Large ships traversing beyond the security perimeter surrounding Balhaf are at higher risk of suffering damage from BBIED attacks than vessels docked at the terminal, or the terminal infrastructure itself.

 

Both the land and marine approaches to Balhaf are heavily protected by the Yemeni military due to the facility's critical national importance, reducing the likelihood of any VBIED or BBIED penetrating perimeter security and inflicting structural damage. A successful onshore attack would be likely to require inside assistance from security personnel. BBIED attacks are more likely to be successful if launched via hard-hulled boats from proper harbours, rather than dinghies off beaches. IHS is not currently aware of any harbours under jihadist control. Large ships traversing beyond the security perimeter surrounding Balhaf are at higher risk of suffering damage from BBIED attacks than vessels docked at the terminal, or the terminal infrastructure itself.

Both the land and marine approaches to Balhaf are heavily protected by the Yemeni military due to the facility's critical national importance, reducing the likelihood of any VBIED or BBIED penetrating perimeter security and inflicting structural damage. A successful onshore attack would be likely to require inside assistance from security personnel. BBIED attacks are more likely to be successful if launched via hard-hulled boats from proper harbours, rather than dinghies off beaches. IHS is not currently aware of any harbours under jihadist control. Large ships traversing beyond the security perimeter surrounding Balhaf are at higher risk of suffering damage from BBIED attacks than vessels docked at the terminal, or the terminal infrastructure itself.

Both the land and marine approaches to Balhaf are heavily protected by the Yemeni military due to the facility's critical national importance, reducing the likelihood of any VBIED or BBIED penetrating perimeter security and inflicting structural damage. A successful onshore attack would be likely to require inside assistance from security personnel. BBIED attacks are more likely to be successful if launched via hard-hulled boats from proper harbours, rather than dinghies off beaches. IHS is not currently aware of any harbours under jihadist control. Large ships traversing beyond the security perimeter surrounding Balhaf are at higher risk of suffering damage from BBIED attacks than vessels docked at the terminal, or the terminal infrastructure itself.