A Thai anti-government protester at a rally outside Government House in Bangkok on Dec. 15. (PORNCHAI KITTIWONGSAKUL/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
As Thailand's opposition movement prepares to hold mass protests to "shut down" Bangkok on Jan. 13, the entire spectrum of royalist and establishment political forces seems to have hardened its position against the ruling Pheu Thai party and supporters of exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and Yingluck, his sister and current prime minister. Most important, the Royal Thai Army has recently changed its tone in speaking about its willingness to stage a coup.
Anti-government forces have created a situation in which they can either interfere with upcoming elections or deprive Pheu Thai of the authority an electoral victory would typically bestow. Meanwhile, Pheu Thai faces the quandary of retaining power amid these procedural and legal challenges while also managing the upcoming protests without tarnishing its image with bloodshed or provoking the military to act on its warnings.
Analysis
The military is the decisive actor in Thai politics -- it has staged 19 coups since 1932, most recently in 2006, when it overthrew Thaksin, greatly amplifying the national political crisis. Because the 2006 coup ultimately came to be seen as detrimental to the military's prestige and the country's stability, the military has since attempted to play a subtler role in influencing politics and has repeatedly eschewed direct intervention. In the current episode of the political crisis, the army has signaled continued neutrality by supporting the Feb. 2 elections (which Pheu Thai is expected to win) and distancing itself from protest leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and his pretensions of creating an alternate government, the People's Democratic Reform Committee, which would supposedly oversee a transition to a new national government appointed by King Bhumibol Adulyadej.
Coup rumors always abound during times of political tension in Thailand, especially given its history, but Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the army chief who hails from the elite Queen's Guard, a unit that has produced several prominent royalist generals, said Dec. 26 that the door to a coup was neither open nor closed. On Jan. 8, responding to questions from reporters about an unspecified number of tanks, helicopters, artillery and armored vehicles moving into Bangkok on Jan. 6, Prayuth said, "I cannot confirm whether there will be or not be a coup."
The general and his army spokesmen have repeatedly denied that these movements portend a coup, insisting instead that the units are being moved for Children's Day on Jan. 11, when the army opens bases for families to visit, and Armed Forces Day on Jan. 18, when the military plans to hold a parade. The army insists that the parade and the atypical inclusion of tanks were planned half a year ago as a show of military strength and are unrelated to the opposition protests, upcoming elections or political tensions.
Furthermore, Yingluck's own deputy defense minister, Gen. Yuthasak Sasiprapa, has refused to rule out the possibility of a coup, using language very similar to his fellow generals on the other side of the political divide. Yingluck's administration does not appear to have broken off talks with top royalist generals, and she has echoed the advice of a powerful rival, Privy Council chief Prem Tinsulanonda, in asking all Thais to follow the king's advice and act within the public interest. Thus the government and the military appear to be counting on uncertainty to dissuade their opponents from acting too boldly.
Nonetheless, distrust between the pro-Thaksin government and royalist military persists, and the military movements and the army chief's ambiguous comments have fueled speculation about whether the military intends to intervene to remove Pheu Thai from power and foreclose the ruling party's increasingly ambitious attempts to revise the constitution and return Thaksin from exile. Indeed, the 2006 coup was preceded by mysterious tank movements and transfers of units into Bangkok. While the army is unlikely to announce a coup far in advance of staging one, Prayuth's evasiveness about the possibility of a coup highlights a fact about the Thai military's historical proclivities -- that a coup is an option -- while also creating more uncertainty.
Gauging the Military's Intentions
Why would the army act and speak in alarming, ambiguous ways while imploring the country to remain calm? It is possible that the army's position has changed in the face of the Pheu Thai party's push for a new popular mandate. An electoral victory in February would enable the party to renew its efforts to revise the constitution and remove various institutional constraints on its electoral strength. In view of this possibility, the army's statements may constitute a plain threat, increasing the likelihood of a coup.
However, rather than reflecting a decision to intervene anytime soon, the army statements may be intended as a warning to the government against using excessive force against protesters or calling out its own swarms of supporters -- the so-called Red Shirts, who have occupied parts of the city in prolonged and bloody protests in the past -- from their strongholds in the north and northeast. The military would prefer that these pro-government supporters hold their protests in their home provinces, as they currently appear most likely to do, rather than in Bangkok. Violence between protesters and military police or among rival protest groups could easily spiral out of control, prompting the military to act.
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If the military prefers to remain neutral, it may have reason to warn the government against provocation. The army may also intend its warnings to force the government to handle the mass protests less decisively, making it easier for protesters to overrun targeted intersections, government buildings or public facilities such as water and electricity systems, trains, ports and airports. In 2008, the army at times yielded to royalist protesters in such a way.
A coup is not inevitable, but the army's recent deployments and shift in tone more likely than not increase the pressure on Pheu Thai as it approaches the elections that the party hoped would prove rejuvenating. Certainly the most recent episode of Thailand's rolling political crisis appears to have escalated.
The army's shift in demeanor has coincided with several signs of a hardening stance from other royalist and establishment political forces. First, the Jan. 13 protests look to be large. On Nov. 24, the royalists drew more than 100,000 protesters to a mass rally, and in former incarnations they have shut down Bangkok's main airports. They also appear likely to create an environment of uncertainty and disorder that would make Yingluck's caretaker government look ineffective, or possibly oppressive, ahead of elections. Second, the opposition Democrat Party claims it will abstain from the Feb. 2 elections in order to deprive Pheu Thai of any real victory. Third, the National Anti-Corruption Commission recently decided to impeach 308 lawmakers, mostly Pheu Thai party members, for their efforts to pass a controversial bill granting amnesty to politicians, including Thaksin, involved in Thailand's decadelong political crisis.
Moreover, the Thai Constitutional Court on Jan. 8 overturned the Pheu Thai party's recent (and only) successful attempt to amend the constitution. These moves could herald more trouble for the ruling party, such as banishment of its members or a disbandment of the party, which has unraveled pro-Thaksin governments in the past.
As the Jan. 13 protest unfolds, it will be especially important to see whether protesters, potential counter-protesters or third-party saboteurs generate high levels of violence or public disorder. The Pheu Thai government and police forces will attempt restraint, but if they are driven to a point where they feel they must use force to dispel protests, and if no other institution intervenes successfully to prevent the appearance of genuine crisis, then the military will have to choose whether to aid the government for a temporary reprieve or take the law into its own hands.
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