Analysis
Editor's Note: As global attention turns to Russia during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi -- with questions about security and culture at the fore -- Stratfor is publishing collections of analyses that illuminate the geopolitical context of the region. Part one looks at Russia's resurgence. The following is the second installment of this series.
Security concerns about militants in the Russian Caucasus have dominated talk ahead of the Winter Olympics in Sochi. Russia inherently breeds instability because it is so large and home to hundreds of ethnicities -- many of which have never wanted to submit to Moscow's authority. The primary cauldron for hostilities is in the Russian Caucasus, a relatively small and mountainous territory home to dozens of ethnic groups, republics and religions. Though the region's rebels pose an obvious threat, the rebels themselves and the threats they pose differ from those faced by Russia in the past. Below is a chronology of Stratfor's coverage of the evolution of militancy in the Russian Caucasus.
Chechnya Ready to Explode Again
May 1, 1997: In 1997, Stratfor recognized that though Russia had just ended a war in the Caucasus republic of Chechnya two years prior, that another war was brewing.
Click to Enlarge
The First Chechen War had started off as a response to the fall of the Soviet Union and Chechen nationalists looking for independence and greater control in the Caucasus. But at the end of the war, there was an infusion of pan-Islamist militants, under the guise of a series of groups under Shamil Basayev. These more ideological militants launched a series of large-scale terrorist attacks on a scale Russia had never seen. In 1995, Basayev's group of more than 100 militants seized a hospital and took nearly 2,000 Russians hostage, killing 129.
This type of attack was a dramatic change in militancy, boosting Chechen separatism and volunteers for the more radical militancy brewing in the Caucasus. These large terrorist events became much more frequent when the Second Chechen War began in 1999. In 2002, nearly 50 Chechen militants took 900 people in a Moscow theater hostage. In 2004, two female suicide bombers simultaneously took down two airplanes flying out of Moscow. Also in 2004, more than 30 Chechens took a school containing more than 1,000 people, mostly children, hostage in Beslan, killing more than 300.
Russia: Putin, Beslan and the Limits of Rhetoric
Sept. 7, 2004: Beslan was a turning point for Russia's response to militancy emanating from the Caucasus. The Russian government had a two-fold approach to crushing the Caucasus militants. The first step was to separate the types of militants in the Caucasus between nationalists, and those more ideologically Islamist, like Basayev's group. The Kremlin co-opted the nationalists, transforming them into regional leaders. This led to the rise of current head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, and his now 40,000-member pro-Kremlin Chechen brigades.
For the second step, the Kremlin sought to wipe out the more ideologically committed militants, which included killing Basayev in 2006. This process was aided by the fact that the Russian military and intelligence services had been strengthened a great deal since their post-Soviet period of weakness by the middle of the Second Chechen War. Consequently, the Russian government was able to use much more aggressive tactics against militancy that it simply was not capable of during the first war.
Russia: The Death of Basayev and the Second-Tier Commanders to Come
July 10, 2006: This approach was effective enough that Russia was able to formally end the war in 2009, though militant activity in the region continues.
Russia Announces Mission Complete
April 16, 2009: Militant groups today are very different than those seen a decade ago. The organization of the militant groups, such as those under the umbrella of the Caucasus Emirate, is much looser and has far fewer active militants. The current militant groups are highly restricted by pressure from the Russian security apparatus, the domestic Caucasus forces that have been co-opted by the Kremlin and by a shrinking supply of resources and militants after more than two decades of fighting. At present, militancy is highly constrained, both in terms of reach and capability.
Special Series: Origins of the Caucasus Emirate
May 23, 2011: Due to the erosion of these groups' abilities, all the recent attacks since the end of the war have been small in size, typically carried out by one or two bombers, and against soft targets like buses or an airport entrance. This is not to say that militants in the Caucasus no longer desire to launch high-profile strikes against Russia, but they do not appear capable of pulling off large-scale attacks or attacks against more difficult targets, as seen in the past.
Sochi 2014: A Security Challenge
Dec. 9, 2013: Clearly, security is a paramount concern for Russia during the Olympics, but it is a concern that must be viewed in the context of the currently hampered militant movements.
Comments
Post a Comment