Analysis
Editor's Note: As global attention turns to Russia during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi -- with questions about security and culture at the fore -- Stratfor is publishing collections of analyses that illuminate the geopolitical context of the region. Part one looks at Russia's resurgence. Part two examines militancy in the Russian Caucasus. The following is the third installment of this series.
While the 1990s were a time of chaos and the turn of the 21st century was a time of rebuilding for Russia, by the mid-2000s political and security developments in the former Soviet space challenged Russia and led the Kremlin to take a more proactive role in the region. Though Russia has made much headway in expanding its influence and shaping political life in the former Soviet states over the past decade, it still faces many constraints such as potential NATO and EU expansion in its neighborhood.
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NATO expands into the former Soviet space
April 2, 2004: In the spring of 2004, three former Soviet republics -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- joined NATO, along with several Central European states. The 2004 accession completed a process that began in the 1990s of former Soviet republics and satellites joining the U.S.-led military alliance. The Kremlin, focused on domestic political consolidation, could not provide the necessary counterweight to curb NATO's expansion to Russia's borders.
Color Revolutions test Russia's limits
Dec. 3, 2004: The Color Revolutions presented Russia with a challenge as the 2003 Rose Revolution brought pro-Western Mikhail Saakashvili to power in Georgia, and the 2004 Orange Revolution led to the victory of a pro-Western coalition in Ukraine. Russia's efforts to influence political transitions in the former Soviet periphery failed as unfriendly governments emerged along the country's western and southern borders.
Russia uses energy politics to flex its muscles
Jan. 2, 2006: Starting in January 2006, Russia used natural gas cutoffs and price hikes in Ukraine to pressure the country politically. Due to Ukraine's role as a transit country for Russian natural gas, Russia's energy posturing emphasized not only to Ukraine but also to the rest of Europe that dependency on Russian imports makes the Kremlin a political actor in Europe that cannot be ignored. Such pressure on Kiev also exploited fractures and disagreements that already existed within the Orange Coalition.
Bucharest NATO Summit threatens Russian interests in the region
April 3, 2008: NATO countries failed to reach a decision on Ukrainian and Georgian membership at the Bucharest Summit but did commit to supporting membership efforts in the future. Furthermore, during the summit the NATO countries officially endorsed U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Ukraine is essential for Russia's ability to defend itself, and the Kremlin regards U.S. plans for a missile defense shield in Central and Eastern Europe as a threat to Russia's security.
Russia reasserts its military power
Aug. 12, 2008: With NATO split over the issue of Georgia's and Ukraine's potential accession, Moscow had to show that the West would not support the former Soviet states should it come to a direct confrontation. Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was designed to re-establish the credibility of the country's military, confirm Russia's position as a regional power and derail any plans for Georgian or Ukrainian NATO accession. Russia's military offensive also sent a strong message to the other former Soviet states. For example, Kazakhstan reconsidered plans for exporting oil west through non-Russian routes, and both Ukraine and Kazakhstan ceased weapon shipments to Georgia as a result of the hostilities.
Political reversals bring pro-Russian governments to office
Jan. 13, 2010: Starting in 2010, political transformations in some former Soviet countries reversed the changes brought about during the Color Revolutions. In January 2010, Ukraine's presidential elections resulted in the victory of Viktor Yanukovich, thus sealing the slow political decline of the factions that led the Orange Revolution and ultimately leading to closer cooperation between Kiev and Moscow. In April of that year, the ouster of former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev signaled an evolution in the country's foreign policy orientation in favor of Russia. In October 2012, Georgia also experienced a major political shift, as the Georgian Dream coalition under the leadership of Bidzina Ivanishvili defeated the victors of the Rose Revolution in the country's parliamentary elections while promising to improve Georgia's relations with Russia.
The Customs Union enhances Russia's economic sphere of influence
July 6, 2010: The Russia-led Customs Union is one of the Kremlin's main vehicles for establishing economic and political integration among the club's member states of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. It is not a recreation of the Soviet Union but a looser alliance in which Moscow will not be responsible for the inner workings of each state. With Armenia and Kyrgyzstan's planned accession, Russia will gain greater economic influence throughout the former Soviet space.
Russia engages in a battle for influence in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
Nov. 27, 2013: Russian pressure and economic incentives led the Yanukovich administration to decline signing the European Union association agreement in 2013. During the November Vilnius Summit, Georgia and Moldova initialed agreements. As ongoing protests challenge the Yanukovich government's decision in Ukraine, and as both Georgia and Moldova struggle with Russian political pressure and their respective pro-Russian breakaway regions, the struggle for influence in the former Soviet periphery is continuing, though Russia retains considerable leverage throughout the region.
Editor's Note: As global attention turns to Russia during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi -- with questions about security and culture at the fore -- Stratfor is publishing collections of analyses that illuminate the geopolitical context of the region. Part one looks at Russia's resurgence. Part two examines militancy in the Russian Caucasus. The following is the third installment of this series.
While the 1990s were a time of chaos and the turn of the 21st century was a time of rebuilding for Russia, by the mid-2000s political and security developments in the former Soviet space challenged Russia and led the Kremlin to take a more proactive role in the region. Though Russia has made much headway in expanding its influence and shaping political life in the former Soviet states over the past decade, it still faces many constraints such as potential NATO and EU expansion in its neighborhood.
Click to Enlarge
NATO expands into the former Soviet space
April 2, 2004: In the spring of 2004, three former Soviet republics -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- joined NATO, along with several Central European states. The 2004 accession completed a process that began in the 1990s of former Soviet republics and satellites joining the U.S.-led military alliance. The Kremlin, focused on domestic political consolidation, could not provide the necessary counterweight to curb NATO's expansion to Russia's borders.
Color Revolutions test Russia's limits
Dec. 3, 2004: The Color Revolutions presented Russia with a challenge as the 2003 Rose Revolution brought pro-Western Mikhail Saakashvili to power in Georgia, and the 2004 Orange Revolution led to the victory of a pro-Western coalition in Ukraine. Russia's efforts to influence political transitions in the former Soviet periphery failed as unfriendly governments emerged along the country's western and southern borders.
Russia uses energy politics to flex its muscles
Jan. 2, 2006: Starting in January 2006, Russia used natural gas cutoffs and price hikes in Ukraine to pressure the country politically. Due to Ukraine's role as a transit country for Russian natural gas, Russia's energy posturing emphasized not only to Ukraine but also to the rest of Europe that dependency on Russian imports makes the Kremlin a political actor in Europe that cannot be ignored. Such pressure on Kiev also exploited fractures and disagreements that already existed within the Orange Coalition.
Bucharest NATO Summit threatens Russian interests in the region
April 3, 2008: NATO countries failed to reach a decision on Ukrainian and Georgian membership at the Bucharest Summit but did commit to supporting membership efforts in the future. Furthermore, during the summit the NATO countries officially endorsed U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Ukraine is essential for Russia's ability to defend itself, and the Kremlin regards U.S. plans for a missile defense shield in Central and Eastern Europe as a threat to Russia's security.
Russia reasserts its military power
Aug. 12, 2008: With NATO split over the issue of Georgia's and Ukraine's potential accession, Moscow had to show that the West would not support the former Soviet states should it come to a direct confrontation. Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was designed to re-establish the credibility of the country's military, confirm Russia's position as a regional power and derail any plans for Georgian or Ukrainian NATO accession. Russia's military offensive also sent a strong message to the other former Soviet states. For example, Kazakhstan reconsidered plans for exporting oil west through non-Russian routes, and both Ukraine and Kazakhstan ceased weapon shipments to Georgia as a result of the hostilities.
Political reversals bring pro-Russian governments to office
Jan. 13, 2010: Starting in 2010, political transformations in some former Soviet countries reversed the changes brought about during the Color Revolutions. In January 2010, Ukraine's presidential elections resulted in the victory of Viktor Yanukovich, thus sealing the slow political decline of the factions that led the Orange Revolution and ultimately leading to closer cooperation between Kiev and Moscow. In April of that year, the ouster of former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev signaled an evolution in the country's foreign policy orientation in favor of Russia. In October 2012, Georgia also experienced a major political shift, as the Georgian Dream coalition under the leadership of Bidzina Ivanishvili defeated the victors of the Rose Revolution in the country's parliamentary elections while promising to improve Georgia's relations with Russia.
The Customs Union enhances Russia's economic sphere of influence
July 6, 2010: The Russia-led Customs Union is one of the Kremlin's main vehicles for establishing economic and political integration among the club's member states of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. It is not a recreation of the Soviet Union but a looser alliance in which Moscow will not be responsible for the inner workings of each state. With Armenia and Kyrgyzstan's planned accession, Russia will gain greater economic influence throughout the former Soviet space.
Russia engages in a battle for influence in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
Nov. 27, 2013: Russian pressure and economic incentives led the Yanukovich administration to decline signing the European Union association agreement in 2013. During the November Vilnius Summit, Georgia and Moldova initialed agreements. As ongoing protests challenge the Yanukovich government's decision in Ukraine, and as both Georgia and Moldova struggle with Russian political pressure and their respective pro-Russian breakaway regions, the struggle for influence in the former Soviet periphery is continuing, though Russia retains considerable leverage throughout the region.
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