Summary
As North Africa continues its post-Arab Spring transition, Morocco and Tunisia have found themselves in flux. Despite the ousting of the president in Tunisia and low-level demonstrations becoming more common in Morocco, Tunis and Rabat have avoided many of the pitfalls seen in Libya and Egypt. Though domestic challenges remain, especially in Tunisia, both countries face greater threats from instability and militancy in neighboring countries than from within their own borders.
Analysis
International focus on North Africa intensified after the Arab Spring. The sweeping unrest that unfolded in 2011 affected much of the Middle East, albeit to varying degrees, but its epicenter was Tunisia. North Africa experienced the greatest unrest in the months and years following the ouster of sitting governments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Significant social unrest occurred in Algeria through much of 2011 and early 2012. Morocco faced greater social unrest than usual, though not to the same degree as other countries in the region. Nonetheless, Moroccan King Mohammad VI enacted a spate of democratic-minded reforms and social programs to quell social unrest.
The Arab Spring began with Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia in December 2010 to protest what has since been described as humiliating economic and political conditions. Following Bouazizi's death on Jan. 4, 2011, Tunisians began a massive, peaceful protest and public campaign to oust longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from office. Ben Ali's 24 years in power were largely an extension of the same autocratic style of government as his predecessor Habib Bourguiba, who held the presidency for 20 years.
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Tunisia's Task
Tunisia is largely resource-poor and wedged between its stronger, wealthier neighbors. Under Bourguiba, Tunisia boasted one of the best institutionalized political systems in the Arab world but featured a virtually single-party political system and a strong centralization of authority under the presidency. Bourguiba's oversight of economic, social and even organized labor networks helped cement his power, which in turn became the foundation of Tunisian stability and regional independence. But the ouster of the Tunisian government has ushered in an era of increased domestic political infighting, rising social unrest and instability and an uptick in militant activity and attacks.
Tunisia's transition largely has been spared the violence seen in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in Libya and Syria. Moreover, while Tunis' political transition has faced some notable challenges, there has not been a mass secondary uprising as seen in Egypt. This has been avoided in part by the retention of some elements of the Ben Ali regime; unlike in neighboring Libya, in Tunisia the political institutions did not exit with the president. But these vestiges of the Ben Ali regime have complicated the aspirations of the Islamist Ennahda party, which won interim government elections in 2012. As these political factions -- split between Islamists and their allies and the remnants of the previous regime -- fight for positions in a future Tunisia, foreign governments such as Algeria have become more capable of moderating and influencing Tunisia's post-revolutionary transition.
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Militant activity and public unrest will remain the biggest challenges to Tunisia's upcoming permanent government, with national elections expected before 2015. Both issues will be aggravated by the ongoing economic downturn as Tunis struggles to reassure foreign (mainly Western) tourists and investors that the country is safe, stable and ready for business, as it was during Ben Ali's tenure. Associated unemployment and a slow expansion of economic activity will continue to undermine the new government's popularity, although as seen in 2012 security issues will continue to vex the Tunisian public. Algerian political and security cooperation will help stabilize and manage some of Tunis' political and security pressures, and overall the risk of social unrest should be manageable.
However, the future government will have to contend with the high expectations and aspirations of an electorate that has grown weary after more than three years without a permanent government. This means that protests, unrest and clashes with police likely are part of Tunisia's immediate future. Meaningful economic growth will continue to lag behind public expectations, with a few years of permanent governance necessary for tourism sector revenues and foreign investment to reach anything near their pre-2011 levels.
Also, Libya's continuing destabilization will affect Tunisian security. Cooperation with the United States and Algeria will become a more effective bulwark against this threat, though the occasional militant attack -- whether attempted or successful -- will become part of Tunisia's post-Arab Spring reality.
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Morocco and the Benefit of Distance
Situated at the extreme northwestern tip of Africa, Morocco is geographically closer to Spain than to Tunisia or Libya. Although locked in a decadeslong competition for regional primacy with its traditional rival, Algeria, Morocco has benefited from Algeria's large and relatively well-secured territory, which buffers Morocco from the unrest in Libya, Mali and elsewhere in the region. Though Rabat is even less energy independent than Tunis, Morocco's dominance in phosphate mining and the rise in global phosphate prices in recent years have helped not only mitigate some of Morocco's traditional economic challenges but also underwrite some of the social spending increases that followed 2011's unrest. Phosphate exports and tourism remain significant contributors to the overall economy, but slowing growth in these sectors and a rising youth population and unemployment remain areas of concern for the kingdom. Strong relationships with Saudi Arabia, the United States and the European Union have remained critical for the stability of Morocco's economy and security, especially as more conservative forms of Islam and rising militancy spread across the region.
Beyond the evolving threat of regional militants, Rabat's geographic isolation and close relationship with foreign partners indicate that the country will enjoy relative stability in its foreseeable future, in stark contrast to the rest of the region. The next two to five years will bring their own challenges as Morocco seeks to slowly reduce its public expenditures and as King Mohammed VI learns to work with a parliament and Islamist political presence that has seen a gradual and managed increase in authority since 2011. However, the monarch is relatively young at 50 years old, which means that Rabat is unlikely to face a serious crisis of transition or internal stability for several years to come. Moreover, while political competition within the parliament will continue, the monarchy will retain its ability to control the direction of debate within the government and faces limited public dissatisfaction.
Moroccan stability and favorable investment laws have encouraged a significant influx of foreign investment in recent years as Rabat tries to reduce its dependence on imported energy and boost its flagging economy. Both onshore and deep-water exploration, including unconventional resources such as shale, have brought in Western investment seeking a more stable or economically preferable operation environment in North Africa than Algeria or Libya can provide. However, this process is limited by the relative scarcity of Moroccan hydrocarbon resources -- a scenario made worse by Morocco's difficulty in establishing internationally recognized authority to grant oil and gas exploration contracts over the territories of Western Sahara. The Western Sahara issue will continue to complicate Morocco's efforts to pursue more meaningful expansion of oil and natural gas exploration and production activities for the foreseeable future. Morocco's economy will not see the benefit of ongoing oil and natural gas exploration and development for several years, and a reliance on imported fuels will mean that the kingdom will continue with its unpopular but necessary subsidy reductions.
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As with other North African states, Morocco faces a substantial threat from regional militants. However, Morocco benefits from the relative insulation provided by Algeria's position between Morocco and the Sahara as well as from Rabat's robust security and military experience. This is not to suggest that Morocco remains immune from either militancy or successful terrorist attacks, but rather that the risk is not as great as in Tunisia, Libya or Algeria.
The question of the status of the Western Sahara remains the biggest potential shift in Morocco's otherwise relatively stable and secure future. Algerian support for the Polisario Front -- the Western Saharan leadership-in-exile in the Algerian town of Tindouf -- has helped keep Western Sahara just beyond the reach of full Moroccan administration and annexation. However, Algerian support has done little to improve the economic situation of the region's ethnic Sahrawi population, and drug smuggling remains a primary economic activity. As Algeria becomes more focused on its own domestic political transition and eastern periphery, Morocco may be able to make its own successful outreach toward the Polisario Front within the next three to five years, particularly if oil and gas exploration within Morocco proper continues attracting investment. If Morocco can demonstrate a more profitable alternative, especially one that is mutually beneficial, Rabat may be able to counter Algerian influence and bring Western Sahara -- and its potential phosphate and energy resources -- more securely within Rabat's sphere of influence.
Though Rabat has virtually annexed much of the population within Western Sahara, legal ambiguities regarding the territory's status have prevented more large-scale investments and resource development. Even if signed, an agreement with Western Sahara establishing a federalist system likely will remain highly contentious and problematic, similar to the challenges Iraq faces in politically managing joint economic interests with the federal Kurdish Regional Government. However, Morocco and eager foreign investors will likely see a shift away from ambiguity, no matter how troublesome, as preferable to keeping the issue in legal limbo.
As North Africa continues its post-Arab Spring transition, Morocco and Tunisia have found themselves in flux. Despite the ousting of the president in Tunisia and low-level demonstrations becoming more common in Morocco, Tunis and Rabat have avoided many of the pitfalls seen in Libya and Egypt. Though domestic challenges remain, especially in Tunisia, both countries face greater threats from instability and militancy in neighboring countries than from within their own borders.
Analysis
International focus on North Africa intensified after the Arab Spring. The sweeping unrest that unfolded in 2011 affected much of the Middle East, albeit to varying degrees, but its epicenter was Tunisia. North Africa experienced the greatest unrest in the months and years following the ouster of sitting governments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Significant social unrest occurred in Algeria through much of 2011 and early 2012. Morocco faced greater social unrest than usual, though not to the same degree as other countries in the region. Nonetheless, Moroccan King Mohammad VI enacted a spate of democratic-minded reforms and social programs to quell social unrest.
The Arab Spring began with Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia in December 2010 to protest what has since been described as humiliating economic and political conditions. Following Bouazizi's death on Jan. 4, 2011, Tunisians began a massive, peaceful protest and public campaign to oust longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from office. Ben Ali's 24 years in power were largely an extension of the same autocratic style of government as his predecessor Habib Bourguiba, who held the presidency for 20 years.
Click to Enlarge
Tunisia's Task
Tunisia is largely resource-poor and wedged between its stronger, wealthier neighbors. Under Bourguiba, Tunisia boasted one of the best institutionalized political systems in the Arab world but featured a virtually single-party political system and a strong centralization of authority under the presidency. Bourguiba's oversight of economic, social and even organized labor networks helped cement his power, which in turn became the foundation of Tunisian stability and regional independence. But the ouster of the Tunisian government has ushered in an era of increased domestic political infighting, rising social unrest and instability and an uptick in militant activity and attacks.
Tunisia's transition largely has been spared the violence seen in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in Libya and Syria. Moreover, while Tunis' political transition has faced some notable challenges, there has not been a mass secondary uprising as seen in Egypt. This has been avoided in part by the retention of some elements of the Ben Ali regime; unlike in neighboring Libya, in Tunisia the political institutions did not exit with the president. But these vestiges of the Ben Ali regime have complicated the aspirations of the Islamist Ennahda party, which won interim government elections in 2012. As these political factions -- split between Islamists and their allies and the remnants of the previous regime -- fight for positions in a future Tunisia, foreign governments such as Algeria have become more capable of moderating and influencing Tunisia's post-revolutionary transition.
Click to Enlarge
Militant activity and public unrest will remain the biggest challenges to Tunisia's upcoming permanent government, with national elections expected before 2015. Both issues will be aggravated by the ongoing economic downturn as Tunis struggles to reassure foreign (mainly Western) tourists and investors that the country is safe, stable and ready for business, as it was during Ben Ali's tenure. Associated unemployment and a slow expansion of economic activity will continue to undermine the new government's popularity, although as seen in 2012 security issues will continue to vex the Tunisian public. Algerian political and security cooperation will help stabilize and manage some of Tunis' political and security pressures, and overall the risk of social unrest should be manageable.
However, the future government will have to contend with the high expectations and aspirations of an electorate that has grown weary after more than three years without a permanent government. This means that protests, unrest and clashes with police likely are part of Tunisia's immediate future. Meaningful economic growth will continue to lag behind public expectations, with a few years of permanent governance necessary for tourism sector revenues and foreign investment to reach anything near their pre-2011 levels.
Also, Libya's continuing destabilization will affect Tunisian security. Cooperation with the United States and Algeria will become a more effective bulwark against this threat, though the occasional militant attack -- whether attempted or successful -- will become part of Tunisia's post-Arab Spring reality.
Click to Enlarge
Morocco and the Benefit of Distance
Situated at the extreme northwestern tip of Africa, Morocco is geographically closer to Spain than to Tunisia or Libya. Although locked in a decadeslong competition for regional primacy with its traditional rival, Algeria, Morocco has benefited from Algeria's large and relatively well-secured territory, which buffers Morocco from the unrest in Libya, Mali and elsewhere in the region. Though Rabat is even less energy independent than Tunis, Morocco's dominance in phosphate mining and the rise in global phosphate prices in recent years have helped not only mitigate some of Morocco's traditional economic challenges but also underwrite some of the social spending increases that followed 2011's unrest. Phosphate exports and tourism remain significant contributors to the overall economy, but slowing growth in these sectors and a rising youth population and unemployment remain areas of concern for the kingdom. Strong relationships with Saudi Arabia, the United States and the European Union have remained critical for the stability of Morocco's economy and security, especially as more conservative forms of Islam and rising militancy spread across the region.
Beyond the evolving threat of regional militants, Rabat's geographic isolation and close relationship with foreign partners indicate that the country will enjoy relative stability in its foreseeable future, in stark contrast to the rest of the region. The next two to five years will bring their own challenges as Morocco seeks to slowly reduce its public expenditures and as King Mohammed VI learns to work with a parliament and Islamist political presence that has seen a gradual and managed increase in authority since 2011. However, the monarch is relatively young at 50 years old, which means that Rabat is unlikely to face a serious crisis of transition or internal stability for several years to come. Moreover, while political competition within the parliament will continue, the monarchy will retain its ability to control the direction of debate within the government and faces limited public dissatisfaction.
Moroccan stability and favorable investment laws have encouraged a significant influx of foreign investment in recent years as Rabat tries to reduce its dependence on imported energy and boost its flagging economy. Both onshore and deep-water exploration, including unconventional resources such as shale, have brought in Western investment seeking a more stable or economically preferable operation environment in North Africa than Algeria or Libya can provide. However, this process is limited by the relative scarcity of Moroccan hydrocarbon resources -- a scenario made worse by Morocco's difficulty in establishing internationally recognized authority to grant oil and gas exploration contracts over the territories of Western Sahara. The Western Sahara issue will continue to complicate Morocco's efforts to pursue more meaningful expansion of oil and natural gas exploration and production activities for the foreseeable future. Morocco's economy will not see the benefit of ongoing oil and natural gas exploration and development for several years, and a reliance on imported fuels will mean that the kingdom will continue with its unpopular but necessary subsidy reductions.
Click to Enlarge
As with other North African states, Morocco faces a substantial threat from regional militants. However, Morocco benefits from the relative insulation provided by Algeria's position between Morocco and the Sahara as well as from Rabat's robust security and military experience. This is not to suggest that Morocco remains immune from either militancy or successful terrorist attacks, but rather that the risk is not as great as in Tunisia, Libya or Algeria.
The question of the status of the Western Sahara remains the biggest potential shift in Morocco's otherwise relatively stable and secure future. Algerian support for the Polisario Front -- the Western Saharan leadership-in-exile in the Algerian town of Tindouf -- has helped keep Western Sahara just beyond the reach of full Moroccan administration and annexation. However, Algerian support has done little to improve the economic situation of the region's ethnic Sahrawi population, and drug smuggling remains a primary economic activity. As Algeria becomes more focused on its own domestic political transition and eastern periphery, Morocco may be able to make its own successful outreach toward the Polisario Front within the next three to five years, particularly if oil and gas exploration within Morocco proper continues attracting investment. If Morocco can demonstrate a more profitable alternative, especially one that is mutually beneficial, Rabat may be able to counter Algerian influence and bring Western Sahara -- and its potential phosphate and energy resources -- more securely within Rabat's sphere of influence.
Though Rabat has virtually annexed much of the population within Western Sahara, legal ambiguities regarding the territory's status have prevented more large-scale investments and resource development. Even if signed, an agreement with Western Sahara establishing a federalist system likely will remain highly contentious and problematic, similar to the challenges Iraq faces in politically managing joint economic interests with the federal Kurdish Regional Government. However, Morocco and eager foreign investors will likely see a shift away from ambiguity, no matter how troublesome, as preferable to keeping the issue in legal limbo.
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