Summary
Algeria, a relative bastion of North African stability, has withstood the sweeping social unrest of 2011, the rise of regional militants in 2012 and a major terrorist attack on an energy installation born out of destabilizing security environments on its borders. Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999, suffered a stroke in April 2013 that has created a new political perplexity and left serious doubts in many Algerians' minds about the ailing leader's ability to successfully oversee the country's looming political transition. In moving away from a tradition of strongly nationalistic and vigorous campaigning, the Bouteflika political machine has to contain backroom political struggles that are now regularly spilling over into public debate rather than focusing on the upcoming election and Bouteflika's transition strategy.
Algeria's April 17 elections will not end the current political impasse and nagging concern regarding the country's future, even with Bouteflika's Feb. 22 confirmation of his candidacy. The question of whether a stable post-Bouteflika transition is possible is likely to linger well beyond the national election. The current squabbling within the country's civilian political leadership, military and intelligence organizations will impede the constitutional and economic reforms necessary to manage Algiers' rising energy and governmental revenue needs within a destabilizing regional security environment.
Analysis
More than two decades of political rule and intrigue built around Bouteflika's careful management, coercion and balancing of Algeria's domestic political competitors is on the verge of unraveling. What will remain is an aging political elite that has for nearly four decades contained power among its own members, having failed to empower a younger generation with the responsibility or experience of rule. Though Algeria's institutions will keep necessary state functions from ceasing, and risk of public unrest has decreased substantially since 2011, Algeria's uncertain political future will carry risks for a country in need of economic and political reform, which could cause delays from the slow-moving elite that could last from several months to years.
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The president's stroke has aggravated a long-standing challenge facing the Algerian government. Algiers has a long history of military intervention into political life, beginning with Col. Houari Boumediene's bloodless coup in 1965 that overthrew Algeria's first post-independence president, Ahmed Ben Bella. Boumediene's government was characterized by its connection to Algeria's independence-era military leadership, military-backed National Liberation Front politics and a small but elite civilian political class. Boumediene's regime defined the following decades of Algerian political culture, regularly intervening in civilian and domestic politics to preserve the independent, secular and revolutionary nature of the state. It also formed the backdrop of Bouteflika's political maturation, with the current president serving as foreign minister in the Boumediene government, proving himself adept at the highly competitive, coercive personality politics that dominated the early Algerian republic's political scene.
Bouteflika's political career flowed and ebbed in the decades following Boumediene's death in 1978. He returned to power as the National Liberation Front's presidential candidate in 1999, at the tail end of a civil war that followed the military's decision to annul the results of the 1991 election that brought an Islamist-dominated parliament to power, threatening the military state's secular Pan-Arab ideology. Overseeing a long and difficult process of national reconciliation, Bouteflika was also at the helm of an ongoing process of increasing civilian oversight of a government long dominated by military interests and those of Algeria's main economic asset, state energy firm Sonatrach.
However, Bouteflika's strategies have hampered the long-term success of his plans. He created the largest hindrance when he replaced the Algerian military's centralized authority with a tightly controlled cadre of politicians, with himself at the center, and empowered the state's military intelligence service -- the Department of Research and Security -- to investigate the elite for corruption and other crimes. Whether through Bouteflika or the military, Algerian geopolitics favor a strong centralization of power. Now, Algeria faces the challenge of finding someone within Bouteflika's circle of trusted political allies who is capable of balancing the various competing interests of the state -- always a difficult task. Not only is Algeria attempting to reform its power structures, it is also in need of a leader who can keep competing political, military and intelligence factions under control while safeguarding Algerian interests in the midst of regional changes and the need for renewed economic activity.
Attempts at Transition
Following the news of Bouteflika's stroke, Algeria began the constitutional reform process announced in 2011 as part of a package of reforms promised in response to rising protests and social unrest. With a post-Bouteflika transition again in question, the past 10 months have seen an ongoing process aimed not only at adjusting some of the more protectionist measures of the Algerian economy -- specifically within the hydrocarbons sector -- but also at creating the position of vice president. The vice presidency has become the focal point of an intense competition among Algeria's political elite -- which helps to explain why Algeria has found it difficult to create such a post in the past. This squabbling formed the backdrop for September's Cabinet reshuffle, the restructuring of the National Liberation Front party apparatus and a transfer of responsibilities away from the Department of Research and Security and toward Bouteflika's allies within the military.
The restructuring of the Department of Research and Security has been particularly contested, yet necessary, as Bouteflika relied upon the state security and intelligence apparatus to balance against the military's entrenched political and economic interests early in his presidential career. The department has used its ability to investigate and aid the prosecution of military and political leaders to strengthen its position and authority dramatically during the past decade, rivaling the military in its ability to shape political discourse and decision-making. In doing so, however, the department has earned the ire of the larger army and military structure from which it was created. This mistrust and competition has been a facet of Algerian political life that Bouteflika has managed, but not eliminated. In his attempts to rein in the Department of Research and Security leadership, Bouteflika has found ready allies among the military leadership he has slowly been stocking with political supporters who have benefitted from Bouteflika's patronage.
Algeria Ends Hostage Standoff
Bouteflika received a boon of sorts following the January 2013 attack on the natural gas processing installations at Ain Amenas. Painted as an intelligence failure and leading to a large number of casualties and ongoing repairs, the incident gave Bouteflika domestic support and political capital to continue reforming and structuring the state intelligence apparatus. Much of the additional authority and increased troops and personnel allocated to the Department of Research and Security and Interior Ministry have been brought back under the control of the military and the Defense Ministry, where Bouteflika has more authority. The Department of Research and Security's ability to conduct investigations into state employees and politicians, including executives at Sonatrach, has been removed, and national police and gendarmerie forces have been removed from intelligence and Interior Ministry control and put under army and Defense Ministry oversight.
In recent weeks the building pressures of a political system facing an uncertain future have become more public. Head of the Department of Research and Security Gen. Mohamed Mediene, also known as "Toufik," has expressed opposition to a fourth Bouteflika term, as have some members of Bouteflika's own National Liberation Front party, who have found their interests sidelined by the recent party restructuring and have dim hopes in a future political order. Opposition to Bouteflika's candidacy was expressed in editorials in February as people on the edge of Algeria's political scene voiced their disapproval of a potential fourth term for the ailing president. Though Bouteflika has issued a statement decrying the divisive politics as part of an international conspiracy (a claim that is almost traditional within the secretive, strongly nationalistic political dialogue of the state), the president has at least acknowledged these criticisms.
Bouteflika's political machine, which includes relations with business groups and the private sector, is managed by Bouteflika's brother Said. The Bouteflika campaign is promoting the idea of a rise in civilian control and accountability for the government -- a notion that resonates within the Algerian public, especially in the changing political climates of a post-Arab Spring North Africa. But Bouteflika's candidacy also reflects the lack of leadership candidates within Algerian politics; even if his health is failing, his continued presence is necessary to give a future candidate any sense of legitimacy and institutional organization. Also, Bouteflika has used his strong links to the country's judiciary to smear enemies and protect allies from accusations of corruption or the threats of judicial inquiries.
Bouteflika's long tenure in Algeria's political life has allowed him to form a strong and pervasive network not only through the military-backed National Liberation Front that dominated Algeria's years as a one-party state but also through many independent parties, including the independent but government-backed National Rally for Democracy. The president's ability to co-opt various members of the opposition is perhaps best evidenced by the rather broad support he received from leftists, the military and even Islamists in his successful bid to amend the constitution so that he could run for a third term in 2009.
But most important has been Bouteflika's quiet restructuring of the military leadership, including Chief of Staff of the People's National Army Ahmed Gaid Salah, a key presidential ally. Gaid Salah was brought into the Cabinet in September 2013 as deputy minister of defense, a position formerly held by Bouteflika, in a move widely interpreted as a reflection of the army's tacit backing of the ailing president.
Though some political parties have decried the idea of Bouteflika seeking a fourth presidential term, many older Algerians still see the president as the father of national reconciliation following Algeria's bitter civil war. Moreover, his attempts to remove the government from the clutches of the shadowy competition between the army and intelligence services have resonated with voters. Higher social spending, while placing additional pressure on the national budget and increasing reliance on hydrocarbon revenues, has also helped maintain Bouteflika's popularity with pensioners and the large population of Algeria's poor, though chronic unemployment remains a problem for the country's youth.
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An Uncertain Future
With the ongoing challenges in neighboring Mali, and following an outflow of regional militants after the French intervention there, most within Algeria's military and security establishment are hesitant to instigate too large of a political fight and risk the distractions that have allowed militants to gain headway in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Civilian leaders, including Bouteflika, also realize the need for strong and effective military and intelligence capabilities to safeguard against the risk of more attacks such as that at Ain Amenas. Although Bouteflika has reorganized some of the former responsibilities of the Department of Research and Security under military oversight, the agency has retained its functions, signaling recognition of the continuing security threats against Algeria. The much larger size and strength of the military in relation to the Department of Research and Security also limits the ability of intelligence forces to push back against Bouteflika's latest power balancing between the military and security factions.
But beyond the persistent specter of militant threats, Algeria faces much larger, long-term structural challenges. With more than 38 million people, Algeria has the Arab world's second-largest population. Approximately 70 percent of the population is under 30, and while estimates vary, most place youth unemployment in excess of 20 percent. To support a young, underemployed population and rising state expenses, Algeria's traditionally energy-based economy is in need of reform and increased foreign investment, especially as domestic consumption of fuel, electricity and energy further strains fluctuating output.
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Algeria is also facing rising problems caused by inflation, and the government has struggled to provide adequate housing, let alone address the issue of unemployment. Algeria's economic difficulties have been exacerbated by the slowing economic growth of the European Union. Europe is not expected to increase its hydrocarbon consumption significantly. Moreover, the crisis is affecting Europeans' ability to invest in North Africa. These factors, along with the increasing wage competitiveness of countries such as Spain affecting plans to send manufacturing jobs to North Africa, present a worrying situation for those in charge of managing Algeria's demographic and economic trends.
Algeria naturally lends itself to a style of rule characterized by a strong centralization of control -- a style that does not easily allow for power sharing. Instead, Algeria has long struggled in releasing the tight hold of the military and intelligence services over state economic assets such as Sonatrach, Africa's largest corporation. Economic and political reform has been made all the more difficult by the unease with which many of Algeria's ruling elite view the future. The largest question for Algeria is not whether Bouteflika will win the upcoming election, but whether he and his cadre can retain the political capital needed to manage a political transition that leads to long-term stability, specifically through the energy, economic and political reforms necessary to prevent the kind of large-scale unrest seen in 2011. While many name current Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal as a possible successor to Bouteflika, Sellal's background and experience as a local politician and respected technocrat do not translate easily into the sort of skilled interpersonal politicking and balancing Bouteflika achieved. Military and security forces will find it difficult to attempt to grab power after Bouteflika leaves politics, not only because of their own competition but also because of the risk of strong public pushback to a move away from elected civilian oversight of the government. Bouteflika has been largely successful in positioning the civilian leadership as the arbiter of disputes between the military and the security apparatus, and it is unlikely that any one group will be able to act unilaterally in the future.
It has been rumored that the ailing president still has great difficulty standing and speaking for long periods -- precisely the opposite image the 76-year-old Bouteflika would like to project during a presidential campaign and ahead of an extended and intense period of domestic political wrangling. A group of close political loyalists -- particularly Sellal, Bouteflika's handpicked prime minister and potential political successor -- are expected to represent Bouteflika during the campaign season. The risk for Algeria is that it could enter a protracted stalemate beset with middling economic growth and sliding hydrocarbon production while public demands on the government rise. This situation would be untenable for Algiers, and should the country tip toward instability, its implications would affect the whole region, which is already failing to contain the consequences of other governments' weak control of their territories. Algeria's upcoming electoral process will serve a perfunctory political function, continuing the mandate of a weakened-yet-still formidable political machine rather than bringing resolution to the lingering question of Algeria's future.
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