(L) Iranian President Hassan Rouhani delivers a speech in Tehran on Feb. 11, 2014. (R) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps head Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari speaks at a press conference in Tehran on Sept. 3, 2007.ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images -/AFP/Getty Images
Summary
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps -- along with other conservative factions in Iran -- is attempting to wield influence over Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's government and its negotiations with the United States on Iran's nuclear program. Rouhani's opponents do not seek to torpedo the talks altogether; rather, they wish to shape the negotiations to protect their interests. Although the corps and its allies have limited options for influencing the diplomatic endeavors, Rouhani eventually will have to find a way to ease their concerns. Despite increasing disruptions and potential delays, the negotiations will likely remain on a long-term track toward a comprehensive settlement between Iran and the United States.
Analysis
The conventional assessment of the ongoing U.S.-Iranian diplomatic talks is that they are extremely fragile. A great deal of emphasis is placed on the Iranian side of this equation, with the assumption that the Iranian establishment is a prisoner of its own ideology and is therefore unlikely to change its behavior. Indeed, statements from Iran's leading clerics, commanders and politicians make it difficult to conclude otherwise.
However, much of Iran's rhetoric is aimed at Western audiences for the sake of posturing and obfuscation. Far more instructive is the discussion occurring among the country's power centers, which contain a complex array of mostly conservative factions, including the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Rouhani's opponents cannot deny that Iran has reached the limits of its ability to move forward, particularly since the latest round of U.S.-led sanctions has threatened Iran's domestic stability and foreign policy prerogatives. Therefore, they cannot argue against the historic negotiations and instead are attempting to shape the process in an effort to secure their interests.
Proponents of 'Resistance Economy'
The Rouhani administration's opponents have been trying to frame their opposition to the talks by using the idea of "resistance economy." The intent behind this notion is to undercut the argument of Rouhani and his allies that Iran's economy cannot be revived without sanctions being lifted. Supporters of the resistance economy idea argue that the country does not need to grant too many concessions on the nuclear issue to effect an economic resurgence, which they argue can be done through better management and by harnessing internal resources. Proponents cite the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' performance in the 1990s post-war reconstruction years as an example and say the corps' expertise can be relied upon in the present circumstances.
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In fact, Fars News Agency reported April 16 that Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh has agreed to cooperate with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' construction arm on four petrochemical companies in Fars province -- an exception to Rouhani's overall policy of wresting control of construction projects from engineering institutions affiliated with the corps. The agreement came two days after Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari said the corps could be involved in implementing resistance economy if the government requests it.
Jafari is not alone in his sentiments. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been championing the concept of resistance economy. However, those calling for this idea do not see it as an alternative to the negotiations and thus wish for the talks to continue.
Key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander and Deputy Joint Chief of the Armed Forces Brig. Gen. Masoud Jazayeri said April 14 that Tehran's "armed forces would not accept any unreasonable (nuclear) agreement." It is notable that he did not say the forces opposed an agreement altogether. In fact, the country’s most senior military commander, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, categorically stated April 10 that the Iranian military is supporting Rouhani's policies and will continue to do so. These statements underscore the lack of consensus within the corps on Tehran's policy of negotiating with the United States. Even those who oppose the policy are not on the same page in terms of the magnitude of opposition or how to oppose the talks.
The Corps' Constraints
A key dilemma for the corps has been that Rouhani has referred to his administration as one of moderation and has accused his opponents of clinging to extremism. Given its ideological nature, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is having a hard time countering this narrative and thus has been on the defensive. In a March 3 editorial in the corps-run daily Javan, Brig. Gen. Yadollah Javani, head of the corps' political affairs bureau, called moderation "an admirable and acceptable concept" but insisted that the corps is not immoderate. These statements show that there is not much the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can do to counter Rouhani's characterizations other than engage in a very public media debate.
Considering that the supreme leader has not directly blocked any of Rouhani's moves -- as he did with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his presidency -- and the legislature has been supportive of the president, the corps lacks effective and legal options for preventing the government from moving forward with its agenda. In fact, even criticism of the government’s policy has to be kept within certain parameters, as is evident from a report that the Supreme National Security Council filed a complaint regarding lawmaker Javad Karimi Ghoddoosi's scathing criticism of the interim agreement between Tehran and the P5+1 group. (Ghoddoosi lodged a counter-complaint, insisting that his criticism was in keeping with his obligations as a lawmaker.)
This means that even in using public debate to place obstacles in Rouhani's path, the corps has to be careful. Already, Khamenei and Rouhani have called on the corps to steer clear of politics. Despite its highly privileged position in the Iranian political system, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can only go so far.
The Rouhani administration has been leveraging the Artesh -- Iran's regular armed forces -- to prevent the corps from creating complications. The recent abduction of five border guards by Baluch Sunni Islamist rebels based in neighboring Pakistan is a case in point. The corps wanted a cross-border operation inside Pakistan. However, the Rouhani government sought a negotiated release of four of the five hostages. Moreover, the previously scheduled joint exercises in the Persian Gulf between the Artesh naval forces and the Pakistani navy helped Tehran prevent the corps from complicating matters at a sensitive time. Tensions between Iran and Pakistan were high with the corps' call for cross-border military action. By going ahead with the naval exercises and giving them a great amount of publicity, Rouhani's government de-escalated matters and countered the corps.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has no good options and has been responding to the government's assertiveness extemporaneously. The corps is on the defensive because it cannot be a substitute for a private sector working with Western investors. The country needs money and technology to revive the energy sector. These are things the corps cannot provide.
The Guard's Strategy
Realizing the limits of what they can do, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its allies are engaged in a two-pronged strategy to ensure that the diplomacy between Washington and Tehran does not undermine their interests.
First, they want to ensure that their economic assets are secured. Toward this end, they are signaling that they will not interfere in politics if these assets are preserved. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has already received a 20 percent boost in its annual budget this year, but clearly it is not ready to be left at the mercy of the government. Jafari's statement that the government should involve the corps in managing the economy speaks volumes. For one thing, at the outset of the public negotiations with the United States, the Rouhani government said it needs the corps to be involved in helping the government resuscitate the economy. In other words, Jafari is reminding Rouhani that the executive branch was supposed to involve the corps in economic matters. At a time when the government is trying to revive a civilian private sector and attract Western investment, the corps wants guarantees that it will continue to enjoy a privileged status.
Second, although the corps and its supporters do not want to derail the talks directly, they hope the negotiations veer off course as a result of U.S. suspicions about the intent behind Iran's nuclear program. For example, a recent statement by former Atomic Energy Organization of Iran chief Fereidoun Abbasi published in the daily Khorasan said that Tehran hid information from the International Atomic Energy Agency for at least seven years. Abbasi said the concealment was informed by Iranian fears that Western intelligence agencies were using the nuclear watchdog's inspections as a means of sabotaging Iran's nuclear program. The timing of the statement indicates that it was intended to encourage perceptions among Western opponents to the negotiations -- especially those in the U.S. Congress -- that the Iranians are not to be trusted. This gives those opponents the means to maintain roadblocks on sanctions relief. As it is, Congress has rejected Rouhani's appointee to the post of Iranian ambassador to the United Nations and has drafted a bill on sanctioning Iran's premier non-state proxy, the Lebanese Shiite Islamist organization Hezbollah, as well as central banks that deal directly with the group. In addition, Iran is facing complications in obtaining spare parts for its civilian aircraft from Boeing and General Electric, which were allowed as part of the interim deal.
In this way, Rouhani's domestic opponents can make up for their inability to directly prevent the government from progressing with the talks and still work toward undermining the diplomatic process. The Rouhani government, while not facing a direct challenge, does have to placate its opponents. However, it can only go so far in assuaging the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' economic concerns.
The corps' revenue sources outside the government-allocated budget have given it an edge over other power centers. But now that the government needs to normalize the economic system and create a vibrant private sector, the corps' largest concern is that it will lose its unique position. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may not have good options for shaping policies, but given its pre-eminent position in security matters it cannot be ignored, either -- especially when the president faces obstacles to his reforms due to the tensions between reformists and pragmatic conservatives within his own camp. Rouhani will therefore be dealing with a critical transition in the political economy at home as he continues to push ahead with the negotiations with the United States toward a final agreement on the nuclear issue.
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