Bolivian military noncomissioned officers march in La Paz on April 24.(AIZAR RALDES/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
On April 24, several hundred non-commissioned officers marched in the third straight day of protests by military personnel across Bolivia, and more demonstrations are expected April 25. The protesters are demanding talks with Bolivian President Evo Morales to address grievances within the military. Despite the marches, the Bolivian government currently faces no direct threat from the military, and neither do foreign companies operating in the country. The protests would have to become significantly larger and spread across the country for the government to face a notable risk.
Analysis
Military personnel began demonstrating April 22 after four non-commissioned officers were removed from their posts for insubordination. The officers had presented to the military high command a series of demands, including higher salaries, improved access to health care and better housing. After the NCOs were removed, protesters added the removal of the defense minister and military chiefs to their list of demands. The protesters are not demanding Morales' ouster -- they would rather hold talks with the president. Several hundred NCOs protested in La Paz on April 23, and about 80 marched in Santa Cruz. Smaller marches were reported in the departments of Beni, Chuquisaca, Oruro, Potosi and Tarija. The largest concentration of protesters marched in downtown La Paz, and no violence has yet been reported at any protest.
Military commanders have so far refused to meet any of the protesters' demands and have instead retaliated through mass dismissals. On April 24, the armed forces announced the firing of 702 NCOs associated with the movement. One day earlier, the air force stripped nine officers of their ranks for backing the protests. About 140 NCOs had already been expelled from courses at military academies since the protests began, and their dismissal has also been attributed to their backing of the protesters' demands. Bolivian Defense Minister Ruben Saavedra, who is considered highly loyal to Morales, announced that any military personnel leading or participating in protests would be fired and face further disciplinary action. Morales has thus far refrained from comment, although protesters claim that the president issued an order April 23 to dismiss protesting personnel from their units.
Measured Reaction by La Paz
The protests are notable because they involve the military, which has long been a pillar of political power in Bolivia. But for now, the protesters are isolated from other politically active groups that could help them pressure the government. Unlike previous cases of widespread unrest in Bolivia, the military protest movement lacks the support of indigenous or agricultural groups that can mobilize thousands of protesters across the country and disrupt transportation and economic activity. The Bolivian government's measured reaction to the protests suggests that it believes the movement does not have significant support even within the military. Without such support, military commanders can likely continue dismissing individual officers involved in the protests without fear of a wider backlash from the military.
The protests are internationally significant because Bolivia's extractive industries are vulnerable to disruption by sustained political instability. These exports directly affect Bolivia's interaction with and relevance to the global economy. In 2012, the mining and energy sectors accounted for nearly $8 billion of the country's $11.7 billion in exports. Since 2005, the value of Bolivian exports has nearly tripled, and the country has enjoyed relative political stability compared to the early 2000s. A more widespread and disruptive military protest movement could conceivably slow or even completely halt road travel networks and affect foreign firms' operations in Bolivia. For now, there is no reason to believe that the protests present any risk to transport networks or extractive industries.
The protest movement appears to be organized by a cohesive, politically active group within the armed forces, and despite its street actions, it remains loyal to the president. This group seems to be operating under the umbrella of the National Association of Non-Commissioned Officers and Sergeants (known by its Spanish acronym, Ascinalss), a social advocacy organization within the armed forces. One of the officers removed from his post April 21 was the leader of the organization. According to a media report, another Ascinalss leader, Sandra Lopez, a political activist ostensibly allied with the ruling Movement Toward Socialism, was already under military intelligence surveillance for helping sponsor political meetings among NCOs.
The Movement Toward Socialism signed a political cooperation agreement with Ascinalss in October 2013 to gain political support from the military ahead of the presidential election planned for October 2014. The relationship between Ascinalss and the government has since deteriorated, largely because military authorities have refused to acquiesce to any of the organization's demands. In theory, Lopez is allied with the Movement Toward Socialism, but the ruling coalition is a loose grouping of political parties and movements, rather than a unified organization. Consequently, Lopez's decision to protest against government policies is not particularly unusual.
The Difference With Previous Protest Movements
For the protest movement to affect the government's national strategy, it would have to grow well beyond its current size and spread across the country. Previous protest movements that pressured Bolivian administrations, such as the 2003 protests that overthrew President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and the 2005 protests that led to President Carlos Mesa's resignation, had broad social bases. The protests pitted social organizations broadly representative of Bolivia's indigenous majority against governments that mostly represented the country's traditional elite. In both instances, labor unions, agricultural organizations and other protest groups blockaded highways and seized buildings across the country for months. The protests led to violent confrontations with security forces, which inflamed the protesters and sparked additional large demonstrations.
The Morales administration faces significantly less pressure from these protests than previous governments did. This is mainly because the Sanchez and Mesa governments did not enjoy the political support that Morales has accrued through high levels of social spending and links to largely indigenous labor and agricultural groups. As president of the Chapare coca growers' federation, Morales' fellow coca farmers joined the Bolivian Labor Center and other social groups in the 2003 protest against exports of liquefied natural gas, among other grievances.
These and other potentially dangerous protest groups are now either loyal to the government or at least not actively opposing it. The Bolivian Labor Center -- Bolivia's largest labor union -- recently reached an agreement with La Paz to raise the minimum wage by 20 percent, to about $208 per month. On April 24, that union released a public statement opposing the military protests. The Union Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers also called on the military to refrain from further protests, and a teachers' union and the Tupac Katari Federation of Farm Workers announced their support for the protests. Still, the vast majority of organizations capable of mobilizing large amounts of people remain loyal to the government.
Popular Support for Morales
Morales' considerable political popularity also prevents the political opposition from capitalizing on unrest. Although the Bolivian opposition presented a credible challenge to Morales in 2008 by threatening to force the political separation of Santa Cruz department and several other regions, its parties remain unpopular among potential voters. An April poll showed Morales leading all candidates, with almost 40 percent of respondents indicating they would vote for him. The conservative politician Manfred Reyes Villa, who lost in the 2009 election to Morales, obtained the support of 21 percent of respondents.
Without support from wider social movements, the military protesters are unlikely to coerce the government into accepting their demands through street action. The military will likely continue countering the protests by firing military personnel who participate in protests, or taking disciplinary action against them. The military protests have so far not gained traction in the officer corps -- indeed, the protesters oppose the benefits given to officers -- so unilateral action against Morales from any group within the military seems unlikely. The government might eventually negotiate on some grievances to avert protests closer to the election, but it is unlikely to completely meet the demands to the rebellious non-commissioned officers.
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