MOSCOW — The separatist demonstrations again churning through eastern Ukraine have raised fears of a Crimean-style invasion by the 40,000 Russian troops coiled just over the Russian border. But Moscow’s goals are more subtle than that, focused on a long-range strategy of preventing Ukraine from escaping Russia’s economic and military orbit, according to political analysts, Kremlin allies and diplomats interviewed this week.
Toward that end, the Kremlin has made one central demand, which does not at first glance seem terribly unreasonable. It wants Kiev to adopt a federal system of government giving far more power to the governors across Ukraine.
“A federal structure will ensure that Ukraine will not be anti-Russian,” said Sergei A. Markov, a Russian political strategist who supports the Kremlin.
Russian officials have said they envision a system in which the regions elect their own leaders and protect their own economic, cultural and religious traditions — including the forging of independent economic ties with Russia.
But many experts sharply dismiss the Russian plan as a stalking horse designed to undercut Ukrainian independence. “It is another way to dismantle and subjugate Ukraine,” said Lilia Shevtsova, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center. “It means Moscow could grab and peel off any part of Ukraine at any time.”
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia “wants Ukraine to be, one, absolutely neutral and, two, dependent on Moscow,” said Vladimir A. Ryzhkov, an opposition politician. “If you have a weak central government and strong governors, you can play directly with the governors over the head of Kiev.”
The United States, while supporting decentralization, has opposed giving too much power to the regions.
Many analysts said the question looming over Ukraine was not simply East versus West. The reality of Russian power is such that Ukrainians must perform a delicate balancing act, giving Mr. Putin enough influence to satisfy his demands while preserving their independence. This will center on the constitutional question of federalism, and will bear close watching, analysts said.
(Russia’s only other oft-stated demand, a simpler one, is preserving Russian as an official language — as it is now in regions where it is widely spoken.)
Russian officials are clear about their goals. “A centralized state will only be good for radicals,” said Sergei A. Zheleznyak, a deputy speaker of the Russian Parliament targeted for sanctions by the United States in March after pushing for the annexation of Crimea, using the shorthand favored by Russian officials to write off much of the Kiev government.
If Mr. Putin believes he is not getting his way on the Constitution, he can be expected to take action before the Ukrainian presidential election scheduled for May 25, when a new government and a new constitution will be cemented, according to a broad range of analysts.
Some analysts are pointing to events surrounding the May 9 anniversary of the defeat of Germany in World War II, when huge emotional crowds fill the streets, as a possible catalyst for Russia to push the solution it wants.
While exactly what the Kremlin will choose to do in the weeks ahead is impossible to predict, analysts cited three potential outcomes.
In the first, Russia either manages to sway the presidential election with a candidate it favors, or it succeeds in putting in place the federal constitution it seeks in order to hold veto power over foreign economic and military policy.
So far, no candidate is allied with Moscow outright. But the two main possibilities are Mikhail Dobkin, the candidate of the Party of Regions, the party long a Moscow favorite, and Yulia V. Tymoshenko, who forged a close working relationship with Mr. Putin when she was prime minister from 2007 to 2010. Ultimately, no Ukrainian leader is likely to risk openly hostile relations with Mr. Putin, given that roughly one-third of the country’s exports go to Russia.
The Kremlin wants to see a proposed constitution that cedes a great deal more power to the governors than the current one does. Analysts suggested that the best compromise would be something along the lines of what many call the “federalization and the Finlandization” of Ukraine. After World War II, Finland adopted a practical approach to its giant yet skittish neighbor — not joining NATO to this day, and avoiding European Union membership until well after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.
The second outcome is a kind of Crimea Annexation Part II, with residents of the east and south voting in a referendum on whether to join Russia. The protesters in Donetsk over the weekend already announced that they would hold such a referendum on May 11, though Moscow did not immediately endorse the proposal.
What worries Ukrainian officials, though, is that the Kremlin could change course and demand a referendum if it deems any new constitution insufficient. That, in turn, could lead to a military incursion.
This second outcome would undoubtedly destabilize Ukraine and thwart a full Western embrace, but it holds significant risks for Moscow.
First, there is no guarantee that Russia could take over large swaths of eastern Ukraine without a fight, as it did in Crimea. In addition, an incursion would almost certainly prompt much more severe American and European sanctions, badly damaging an already stagnating Russian economy. The United States said on Monday that any Russian interference in Ukraine would be considered a “serious escalation” that could prompt more sanctions.
Trying to bite off a chunk of Ukraine itself could also prove unpopular among Russians, and western Ukraine could emerge as a solid, anti-Russian ally of the West not terribly far from Russia’s borders.
There is also strong reason to believe that in a fair vote, the referendum would result in defeat. There has been no significant popular groundswell for joining Russia, as there was in Crimea, which was part of Russia until 1954 and is home to a significant population of Russian military veterans.
Perhaps most important, the oligarchs in eastern Ukraine, several of whom now govern the region, remain mostly opposed to becoming part of Russia.
The third and least likely outcome is a full-scale military invasion.
Domestic support for Mr. Putin skyrocketed after the annexation of Crimea and the Sochi Olympics. But the financial cost of an invasion, along with the potential for Russians coming home in body bags, could quickly reverse his roughly 70 percent approval rating.
Nevertheless, analysts said, an invasion cannot be ruled out. If Mr. Putin is driven solely by the emotional desire to recreate the Russian empire, or if Russian speakers are killed in any significant numbers, he may feel he has no choice but to respond with force.
The Kremlin’s propaganda machine has certainly been laying the groundwork for this possibility, with its constant stream of reports thatNazism is rising from the dustbins of history in Ukraine and is prepared to join forces with NATO. “Putin believes that if he allows this ultranationalist junta to consolidate power, it will be war eventually anyway, but with a much stronger U.S.-controlled army,” Mr. Markov said. “Better to resolve the problem when the situation is soft.”
Russia deploys a well-worn playbook to destabilize former Soviet republics that lean too far westward or risk becoming too independent. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova have all been subjected to Moscow’s strategy of taking chunks of territory, staying involved in their affairs and rendering them unpalatable to the West.
Ukraine is even more problematic because of its strategic position between Russia and Europe and its fundamental historic, cultural and religious ties to the Russian empire. Mr. Putin had envisioned Ukraine as the cornerstone of a budding Eurasian customs unit that would recreate the Russian empire in breadth and strength, acting as an anti-Western alternative to the European Union.
Still, most doubt the Ukraine crisis will come to a military solution.
Sergei Karaganov, dean of the School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs here and an occasional Kremlin consultant on foreign policy, noted that Russia had all manner of significant economic and other leverage, starting with gas supplies, that it could use before resorting to force. Mr. Karaganov is often credited with initiating the doctrine that Moscow should champion the interests of millions of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers left outside the borders when the Soviet Union collapsed.
“There are people who want to reunite with Ukraine,” he said, “but I don’t think that is the majority, even in the Kremlin.”
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