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China: Transshipment Proposal Could Bolster Vale



A man speaks on a walkie talkie near Valemax ship Rio de Janeiro at the harbor of Rotterdam on January 10, 2012.(LEX VAN LIESHOUT/AFP/Getty Images)

Summary


At a recent conference in Brasilia, Chinese Ambassador to Brazil Li Jinzhang relayed the Chinese Ministry of Transport's interest in a transshipment joint venture with Brazil-based multinational mining and logistics company Vale S.A. The potential agreement would aim to lower transportation costs for Brazilian iron ore and thereby reduce input prices for China's beleaguered steelmakers.

The ambassador's comments were meant only to express interest, and the venture is still inchoate. However, the ambassador's comment is something of a peace offering to Vale. Since January 2012, the Chinese government has barred the company's fleet of 30 (soon to be 35) massive iron ore bulk carriers, referred to as Valemax ships, from docking at Chinese ports. The joint venture could allow for Valemax ships to offload iron ore at floating transshipment terminals or other Asian ports onto smaller vessels, which would then carry the ore to Chinese ports. China is by far Vale's largest customer, and Chinese state-owned shipbuilders participated in the construction of the fleet. The Valemax fleet was designed to lower Vale's shipping costs, currently around $22 per ton, by as much as $7 in order to bring it closer to Australian costs of $12 per ton.

It is still unclear whether the proposal represents emerging policy or is merely, at this point, a statement. For now, the significance of the ambassador's comment lies in what it implies about Vale's ultimate goal of direct access for its Valemax fleet to Chinese ports, suggesting that this alternative offer will let China keep its ban on direct docking in place for the foreseeable future.

Analysis


The Chinese iron ore market is the ultimate prize for the "big three" international mining firms -- a term referring to Vale and its Australian competitors, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. In the decade since China became a net iron ore importer, its iron ore imports have skyrocketed to meet the demands of its steel industry. At the turn of the century, China accounted for less than 20 percent of global iron ore imports by volume. By 2013, Chinese steel mills consumed 64 percent of all globally traded iron ore -- more than six times the amount purchased by the next largest importer, Japan. China took in 728 of the 769 million tons (nearly 95 percent) of the annual iron ore output added to the market between 2001 and 2013.

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China's explosive rise as the world's top iron ore importer has reshaped the geography of the global iron ore trade and accelerated an eastward shift that began with Japan's post-World War II economic boom and continued through the rise of South Korea, Taiwan and other resource-intensive Asian economies in the 1980s and 1990s. For miners whose output comes from projects in nearby Australia, this shift has generated easy and handsome dividends. But for those whose production base lies outside the region, it has given way to new challenges and raised risks for companies and economies that have come to depend on Chinese demand. Between 2000 and 2011, the portion of Vale's ore going to Asia rose from 50 to 70 percent. Vale sources nearly all of its iron ore from two large mines in Brazil. Industry competition and Beijing's shifting policy priorities, coupled with an increasing reliance on China, have compounded Vale's disadvantage.
Vale's Uncertain Position in China

China has a history of contentious relations with Vale, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, which taken together provide the majority of the roughly 60 percent of Chinese iron ore imports sourced from Brazil and Australia annually. Relations hit a low point in 2009, when the Chinese government tried to use its growing clout in global iron ore markets to push Vale, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto into offering steep price cuts during the annual iron ore contract pricing negotiations. China's maneuver failed and negotiations broke down. This forced Chinese steel companies to enter directly into more expensive private supply contracts with the three companies or to source their ore on volatile, often higher-priced spot markets.

The episode helped to drive average profit margins for Chinese steelmakers down from around 8 percent during the 2001-2005 period to less than 3 percent in recent years, hitting 1.7 percent in 2012 and nearly zero in 2013. It also boosted Beijing's efforts to expand domestic iron ore production and curb imports by consolidating steel capacity. So far, neither the Chinese initiative to boost higher quality domestic ore production nor that to consolidate steel output has met with much success.

Aside from these pricing disputes, however, Vale remained more accommodating to Chinese authorities than its two key competitors. This stemmed partly from the need to compensate for the location of Vale's production base, the remoteness of which made it difficult to compete with Asian and Australian miners. Their proximity gave them more room to maneuver by providing a buffer against volatility in iron ore prices and shipping rates. It also made it cost-effective for them to use less-efficient Capesize vessels, which, with a capacity of 180,000 deadweight tons, have less than half the capacity of the largest Valemax ships (400,000 deadweight tons).

In 2007, Vale began working with Chinese shipbuilders to design the large, iron ore-specific Valemax carriers. The goals were manifold. Valemax ships would reduce fuel requirements an estimated 35 percent per ton of iron ore compared to Capesize ships. This would also reduce emissions levels. The vessels were also designed to offload cargo roughly twice as fast and, if allowed to dock directly at ports, reduce Vale's shipping times from 40 to 35 days. Over the following year, Vale commissioned a fleet of 35 Valemax vessels, 24 of which were to be built by Chinese state-owned shipbuilders. To date, 30 of 35 planned ships are complete and operating regularly, accounting for roughly one-third of Vale's Asia export capacity.



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Vale's problems in China did not begin until long after the Valemax fleet, including the 24 ships Chinese companies are building, were commissioned and under construction. In fact, in December 2011, the first Valemax vessel, a carrier operated by Berge Bulk with a carrying capacity of 350,000 deadweight tons, successfully unloaded at China's port of Dalian. But China's Capesize operators, especially state-owned shipper China Ocean Shipping Group Co., were fearful of losing market share to Vale at a time of falling demand and overcapacity. Coupled with Beijing's concerns over growing resource supply chain vulnerabilities, this led the Ministry of Transport to issue Circular No. 13 in January 2011 -- a policy that repealed the discretion of individual ports to determine the safety of berthing larger vessels and explicitly barred ships with a capacity of 350,000 deadweight tons or more from docking at Chinese ports. Vale's decision to build most of its new fleet in China, an unpopular move in Brazil, was meant to curry favor with Beijing. Instead, the company was caught up in the perennial struggle between China's industrial sectors, which each seek to convince Beijing that the nation's domestic and geopolitical imperatives are in line with their corporate interests. In this case, Beijing chose to bolster its shipping industry at a time of crisis, to the detriment of Vale.

Vale, however, was relatively insulated from the immediate impacts of the ban. The company benefited from the high ore content of its product relative to Australian and especially Chinese iron ore, bolstering per unit returns. Iron ore spot prices also rallied in the second half of 2012, as the Chinese government loosened credit controls and other restrictions on property development following a round of extreme tightening between late 2011 and early 2012. The temporary spike in prices did not reach the peak levels of 2010-2011 but provided a buffer for Vale's profit margins and partially offset losses due to the ban. The start of operations at a new floating transshipment station in the Philippines' Subic Bay, designed specifically for Valemax vessels en route to major East Asian consumers, also aided Vale's position in China. Vale has since added a second floating transshipment station in the Philippines and is developing a third in Malaysia.
Going Forward

Now, however, Vale can no longer depend on high iron ore prices, which are set to enter a protracted trough due to sliding global demand growth and large supply expansions planned during the 2008-2011 boom years. Vale's ability to remain competitive in Asian and especially Chinese markets will depend on its ability to make full use of its new Valemax fleet to reduce transport costs and bring supply chain inefficiencies to a minimum. And in spite of recent comments by Vale's leadership that direct port access is desirable but not necessary, the company's profits have lagged in recent months due to slumping prices and would benefit greatly from the reduced shipping costs and shortened shipping times.

But were Beijing to lift the ban on direct docking by the Valemax fleet, Chinese state-owned Capesize operators would lose a sizable portion of their business. This, coupled with concerns about ceding too much of China's resource supply chain to external actors, will continue to make adjustment or repeal of the ban difficult.

As conditions in China's property markets worsen over the coming 12-24 months, the Communist Party may seek ways to lessen the pressure on Chinese steelmakers. These measures could include temporary and limited relaxation of restrictions on docking Valemax ships at Chinese ports such as Dalian and Qingdao, both of which are fully capable of unloading vessels with a capacity of more than 350,000 deadweight tons. But wholesale repeal of the ban remains highly unlikely in the near future. The Chinese ambassador's proposed joint venture underscores this point and would streamline, rather than eliminate, the use of Chinese vessels in conjunction with the Valemax fleet. Pressure from Chinese steelmakers will continue, but while the industry is critical and politically powerful, it is also the target of significant consolidation and reform. For this reason, its concerns are unlikely to override those of state-owned shippers or Beijing's persistent fear of losing control over its resource supply chains.


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