Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L) and Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin are embarking on a series of diplomatic visits.(Evert-Jan Daniels - Pool/Getty Images, DIETER NAGL/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
The Kremlin is looking for ways to maintain its influence in Russia's borderlands even as Washington becomes more involved there. With the United States becoming more assertive in the region, Russian officials will use economic tools and military threats -- as well as incentives ranging from loans to energy price discounts -- to counterbalance Washington's efforts toward constructing a regional alliance against Moscow.
Analysis
In the coming weeks, Russian officials will meet with a variety of leaders throughout Russia's periphery. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has already begun a two-day visit to Finland, and this week he is scheduled to meet with Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in St. Petersburg as part of the Kaliningrad Triangle group. He will then travel to Serbia and Azerbaijan. Bulgaria's foreign minister has indicated that Lavrov will visit Bulgaria in July.
Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin will visit Moldova and Transdniestria on June 9 and 10. These meetings follow U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Poland, Vice President Joe Biden's and other high-ranking officials' trip to Romania and Cyprus, pro-Western businessman Petro Poroshenko's inauguration as Ukraine's new president and the announcement of the U.S.-sponsored European Reassurance Initiative.
Click to Enlarge
Lavrov's meeting with Steinmeier and Sikorski had been scheduled in January as a part of a regular forum. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry's focus on Finland, Serbia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Moldova indicates that Russia is trying to shore up support in its borderlands -- a response to Western efforts to create a new alliance in the region stretching from the Baltics and Poland to Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Seeking Neutrality
The announcement that Lavrov would visit Finland comes as Finland debates whether to join NATO. Finnish President Sauli Niinisto has said that Helsinki would only make a decision on NATO membership after a comprehensive review and a national referendum. Finland's neutrality dates back to the early years of the Cold War. However, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine has accentuated a key characteristic of Finnish foreign policy: the need to find a balance between the East and the West. Joining NATO would break this balance. Moreover, Finland's accession to NATO would strengthen the alliance's presence on Russian borders and expand the emerging U.S.-backed alliance in the region. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, regards Finland as an important buffer state. The aim of Lavrov's trip, therefore, is at least in part to dissuade Finland's leaders from integrating more closely with Western institutions.
Likewise, Lavrov's decision to travel to Azerbaijan is an attempt to safeguard the country's neutrality. Azerbaijan's strategy in recent years has been to balance Russia and the West. Azerbaijan is not a member of NATO, but the alliance often trains Azerbaijan's military. At the same time, Azerbaijan cooperates economically with Russia, and the two recently resumed energy ties. In early June, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan resumed natural gas exports to Russia. In addition, Moscow provides the majority of Azerbaijan's arms. Nevertheless, Russia's involvement in the Ukraine crisis has aggravated Azerbaijan's concerns about potential Russian military moves in the Caucasus.
Furthermore, as the West focuses on exploring options to diversify away from dependence on Russian energy, Western governments are looking to Azerbaijan as a potential source and as a transport hub for natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe. However, any progress on the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline would require Moscow's consent. Moreover, Russia's levers in Azerbaijan include a military presence in neighboring Armenia and a naval presence in the Caspian Sea. Lavrov may be visiting Baku to remind Azerbaijan's leaders of Russia's leverage and to present alternatives to the West's offers for cooperation.
Diplomacy Further Afield
Bulgaria and Serbia are not in Russia's immediate neighborhood but traditionally have enjoyed close political and cultural ties with Moscow. In the past few years, the Kremlin's relationship with both Sofia and Belgrade centered on Russian loans and the construction of the South Stream natural gas pipeline. Bulgaria has clashed with the EU Commission over plans to build the South Stream pipeline regardless of the European Union's objections to Gazprom's business practices. But on June 8, following a meeting with several U.S. lawmakers, Bulgarian Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski announced that Bulgaria would suspend work on the South Stream pipeline. While Bulgaria's decision is a means to delay potential penalties from the European Union, it is notable that a week earlier, during the NATO defense ministers' meeting, Bulgarian Defense Minister Angel Naidenov asked the alliance to increase the use and number of troops at U.S. military bases in Bulgaria.
As the United States shows more interest in the Black Sea region (U.S. officials have held several meetings in Romania) Bulgaria, which has for years carefully balanced its close economic relationship with Russia with its status as an EU and NATO member, may be signaling that it would like to play a role in the emerging alliance. Lavrov's visits to the Balkans will therefore focus on both safeguarding the future of the South Stream project and attempting to dissuade Bulgaria's government from seeking a greater NATO presence in the region.
Karasin's trip to Moldova and its breakaway region of Transdniestria will come as Moldova, as well as Georgia and Ukraine, prepares to sign an EU association agreement June 27. For the Kremlin, Moldova's decision to sign the EU agreement threatens Russia's political and economic clout in the country. Despite Moldova's plans to sign the agreement, the Moldovan breakaway territory of Transdniestria, the autonomous region of Gagauzia and Moldova's opposition Communist Party oppose Chisinau's steps toward European integration.
If Moldova signs the EU agreements, Russia is expected to use economic tools, such as trade restrictions, as well as its ties with the Communist Party to pressure Chisinau. Moreover, Russia's military presence in Transdniestria is an important lever for Moscow in the region. Karasin's talks in Chisinau and Tiraspol will therefore be important in shaping Russia's response to Moldova's decision on the EU agreements.
As the Ukraine crisis continues, the United States has become more involved in the region. Washington is now planning on providing Ukraine's military with non-lethal aid. The United States has also announced that it would increase aid to Georgia and Moldova while NATO works to cooperate more closely with countries in Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland and Romania. Lavrov and Karasin's plans for the upcoming weeks show that Russia is making countermoves in its borderlands. However, the Kremlin will face serious challenges as it attempts to increase its influence in the region.
Comments
Post a Comment