Skip to main content

Turkey Mulls a Response to the Jihadist Crisis in Iraq



The Iraqi army's weaknesses have been exposed, along with the significant local Sunni tribal support that apparently proved instrumental in facilitating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's offensive in Iraq. That leaves a heavy burden on Iraq's Kurdish peshmerga to try to contain the threat. Peshmerga forces will concentrate on protecting key energy infrastructure in the northern disputed territories. At the same time, Turkey could see an opportunity to use the jihadist threat to deepen its military presence in northern Iraq.

The Kurdistan Regional Government will try to leverage Baghdad's desperation for military support to negotiate a deal on energy distribution and revenues. But the Kurdish leadership also cannot afford to have the rising jihadist threat destroy Iraqi Kurdistan's reputation as a haven for investors. The refinery at Baiji between the cities of Mosul and Tikrit remains dangerously exposed, and critical energy infrastructure in Kirkuk lies on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's warpath. Even though Baghdad and Arbil are in the middle of a dispute over energy, the urgency of the ISIL threat will drive them to cooperate on the security front for now. Baghdad will have to swallow a bitter pill in this process as Kurdish forces extend deeper into disputed areas of Ninawa province and Kirkuk, thereby reinforcing the Kurdistan Regional Government's long-term agenda of establishing de facto Kurdish authority over its energy-rich periphery.


But the peshmerga may not be operating alone. Turkey's moves in particular will be critical to watch in the coming days. In backing the Kurdistan Regional Government's energy export policy, Ankara has put itself at odds with Baghdad. At the same time, Turkish Energy Co., a state-owned firm closely tied to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been steadily increasing its stake in Kurdish energy. Most recently, it acquired a 20 percent stake in ExxonMobil's six energy blocks, two of which are close to Mosul and one of which is in Kirkuk province. For its part, the ISIL has demonstrated a deliberate targeting of Turkish interests in the current offensive, something it similarly demonstrated in Syria over the past year. ISIL raided the Turkish Consulate in Mosul on June 11, capturing 49 employees -- including the consul-general, a close adviser of Erdogan. The group also abducted 31 Turkish truck drivers.

ISIL is trying to prompt a Turkish overreaction. Turkish special operations forces are probably planning a rescue operation to free the Turkish hostages. Turkey already keeps a quiet military presence farther north in the Kurdish province of Dahuk. Roughly 2,500 Turkish troops are there divided between four outposts in Bamerni, Batufa, Dilmentepe and Kanimasi. Turkish military and intelligence also operate out of offices in the cities of Sulaymaniyah and Arbil. Uneasy with Turkey's growing influence in northern Iraq, Baghdad voted in 2012 to outlaw all foreign forces, including Turkish troops, from the country, but Ankara's close (for now) relationship with Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani has enabled Turkey to maintain a presence in the north. Turkey so far has used its military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan mainly for intelligence purposes with the aim of monitoring Kurdistan Workers' Party activity in northern Iraq, but it could shift its focus to the emergent ISIL threat. Calls by the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Syrian-based Kurdish People's Protection Units to reinforce the peshmerga in the fight against ISIL create an additional incentive for Turkey to respond to the developments in Iraq while simultaneously maintaining a close eye on Kurdish militant activity in the area.

Turkey held an emergency informational meeting with fellow NATO members June 11 and numerous crisis meetings. Erdogan met with Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay and National Intelligence Agency chief Hakan Fidan. President Abdullah Gul and Turkish Chief of Staff Gen. Necdet Ozel took part in a second meeting between Atalay and Fidan. Together the two meetings lasted more than four hours, and no press statement was released. Erdogan also had a phone conversation with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, while Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who cut short his U.S. trip due to the Iraq crisis, had a phone meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Kurdistan Regional Government officials. Turkey is evidently in the process of gauging how much support it can expect from the United States and how much effort it will need to expend itself.

To be sure, Turkey is not looking for a fight with the ISIL. When the ISIL similarly provoked Turkey along the Turkish border in Syria, the Turkish government responded with limited cross-border action. It remained largely on the defensive, however, while trying to play factions within the rebel landscape against one another. On the other hand, Turkey has more substantial interests in northern Iraq to consider. In addition to using its military and intelligence presence in the north to keep Kurdish ambitions in check, energy firms operating out of northern Iraq are also looking principally to Turkey to help safeguard their investments. Their need for Turkish help is particularly acute given the U.S. interest in keeping its distance from Iraq while it focuses on other matters. Turkey is unlikely to venture into hostile Sunni territory in Iraq, but Ankara could use the opportunity to beef up its presence in Iraqi Kurdistan to help reinforce the peshmerga around critical installations. Barzani would face a backlash from within the Kurdistan Regional Government for allowing such a build-up, but Iraqi Kurdistan wholly relies on Turkey to permit oil exports from northern Iraq.

There are no answers as to how Turkey will respond at this point, only a series of crisis meetings, a lot of nervous energy investors and a potential opportunity for Turkey to deepen its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran is already gearing up Shiite militant proxies from multiple directions to battle the ISIL. Turkey lacks such proxies, but it has no less a stake in the outcome of this conflict than its Persian neighbor.


Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Why States Still Use Barrel Bombs

Smoke ascends after a Syrian military helicopter allegedly dropped a barrel bomb over the city of Daraya on Jan. 31.(FADI DIRANI/AFP/Getty Images) Summary Barrel bombs are not especially effective weapons. They are often poorly constructed; they fail to detonate more often than other devices constructed for a similar purpose; and their lack of precision means they can have a disproportionate effect on civilian populations. However, combatants continue to use barrel bombs in conflicts, including in recent and ongoing conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, and they are ideally suited to the requirements of resource-poor states. Analysis Barrel bombs are improvised devices that contain explosive filling and shrapnel packed into a container, often in a cylindrical shape such as a barrel. The devices continue to be dropped on towns all over Syria . Indeed, there have been several documented cases of their use in Iraq over the past months, and residents of the city of Mosul, which was re
Post a Comment
Read more

Russia Looks East for New Oil Markets

Click to Enlarge In the final years of the Soviet Union, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev began orienting his foreign policy toward Asia in response to a rising Japan. Putin has also piloted a much-touted pivot to Asia, coinciding with renewed U.S. interest in the area. A good expression of intent was Russia's hosting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in 2012 in Vladivostok, near Russia's borders with China and North Korea. Although its efforts in Asia have been limited by more direct interests in Russia's periphery and in Europe, Moscow recently has been able to look more to the east. Part of this renewed interest involves finding new export markets for Russian hydrocarbons. Russia's economy relies on energy exports, particularly crude oil and natural gas exported via pipeline to the West. However, Western Europe is diversifying its energy sources as new supplies come online out of a desire to reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies . This has
Post a Comment
Read more

LONDON POLICE INDIRECTLY ENCOURAGE CRIMINALS TO ATTACK RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC PROPERTY

ILLUSTRATIVE IMAGE A few days ago an unknown perpetrator trespassed on the territory of the Russian Trade Delegation in London, causing damage to the property and the vehicles belonging to the trade delegation , Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said during the September 12 press briefing. The diplomat revealed the response by the London police was discouraging. Police told that the case does not have any prospects and is likely to be closed. This was made despite the fact that the British law enforcement was provided with video surveillance tapes and detailed information shedding light on the incident. By this byehavior, British law inforcements indirectly encourage criminals to continue attacks on Russian diplomatic property in the UK. Zakharova’s statement on “Trespassing on the Russian Trade Mission premises in London” ( source ): During our briefings, we have repeatedly discussed compliance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, specif
1 comment
Read more