Hypersonic Missiles Hypersonic missiles are a new category of weapons which have sparked intense debate among security experts. Capable of travelling over five times the speed of sound (Mach 5), and of performing evasive maneuvers mid-flight, they are considered practically impossible to intercept using conventional missile defense systems. Adding that in some cases they can carry nuclear warheads, it is immediately clear why they have caused so much concern in regard to their impact on the global strategic equilibrium. The world’s leading military powers (the United States, China, and Russia) and other states are working on their development. Even though their specific technical characteristics and actual performance remain shrouded in secrecy, hypersonic weapons are poised to become an integral part of future warfare, with noteworthy implications in military and international terms.
HYPERSONIC MISSILES:
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART By definition, hypersonic missiles are vectors capable of reaching speeds equal or superior to Mach 5. There are two sub-types of systems. The first is hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), which are launched by ballistic missiles and separate from them in flight to glide at hypersonic speed toward their target; the second is hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs), which are fired like conventional cruise missiles and use scramjet engines to reach the required speed.
In both cases, their sheer rapidity combined with the ability to perform complex evasive maneuvers makes interception a nearlyimpossible challenge. As of today, no missile defense system is considered capable of intercepting hypersonic vectors. The United States has explored various anti-hypersonic solutions, but they are still at an early stage of development.
Accordingly, no effective defenses exist today against hypersonic strikes; and even though progress may be made in the future, interception will remain a daunting technical challenge, especially in the case of a large-scale attack. Moreover, the fact that hypersonic systems can be armed with nuclear warheads elevates this technical problem to the level of strategic deterrence.
Unsurprisingly, the United States has paid particular attention to the development of hypersonic missiles, monitoring both progress made by its own programs as well as those of competitors and allies, as shown by a recent report by the Congressional Research Service.3 Russia and China are developing hypersonic weapons in the context of their antiaccess / area denial (A2/AD) strategy designed to keep US forces far from their territory and make it impossible for them effectively operate nearby. According to this logic, hypersonic missiles would be used to threaten US carrier battle groups, forward bases, logistical infrastructure, etc. In addition, both regard hypersonic vectors as a - countermeasure to overcome US anti-ballistic missile defenses, which in their opinion undermine the nuclear balance by (theoretically) allowing the US to launch their nuclear weapons without fear of retaliation. Owing to their ability to bypass existing defenses, hypersonic missiles would deprive America of its perceived advantage and restore the traditional equilibrium based on mutually assured destruction (MAD). China has developed a single hypersonic weapon, the DF-ZF (previously called WU14). This HGV is believed to have a range of 2,000 kilometers and a top speed of Mach 10, and is mainly conceived as an anti-ship ‘carrier killer’ weapon.
China has not clarified whether it will be nuclear-capable or not, but has allegedly tested ballistic missiles for its launch, notably the DF-21D. The weapon may become operational before the end of this year. US sources also claim that China tested a Mach 6 hypersonic vehicle called Xing Kong 2 (‘Starry King 2’) in 2018, but there is little info on this system. For its part, Russia seems to be leading the way in the deployment of hypersonic systems. The Avangard (Project 4202 / Yu-74) is a nuclear-capable HGV which entered into service in 2019. With a range of at least 6,000 kilometers, it is equipped with electronic countermeasures, it can perform evasive maneuvers and it can allegedly reach Mach 20; even though this may well be an exaggeration.
The 3M22 Tsirkon (Zircon) cruise missile has an estimated range between 400 and 1,000 kilometers and a speed between Mach 6 and 8. It is primarily conceived as an anti-ship weapon fired by naval and air units. The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (‘Dagger’) is an atypical system, since it is neither an HGV nor an HCM but rather a hypersonic ballistic missile. With a range of 2,000 kilometers, it can reportedly reach Mach 10. It can carry a nuclear payload and strike ground and naval targets alike. It is expected to become operational in 2020.
The US started developing hypersonic weapons as a possible implementation of the Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept, meant to enable American forces to hit any target in the world within one hour. Dating back to 2008, it was revived to counter China’s and Russia’s A2/AD strategy by enabling US forces to strike sensible targets like Command, Control, and Communication (C3) centers, military bases, logistical nodes, critical infrastructures and other strategic facilities to undermine the enemy’s warfighting capabilities. Currently, the US has three hypersonic missile programs. First comes the Navy-led Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), meant to equip a Virginia-class submarine with HGVs. This vector is also the basis for the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) of the Army, aimed at developing a land-based mobile vector with a range of 2,200 kilometers.
Lastly, the Air Force is developing the AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), smaller in size and meant to equip B-52 strategic bombers. It is important to note that, according to official declarations, none of these programs are on-track to develop nuclear-capable vectors. - 8 - Other powers are developing hypersonic weapons. Australia is cooperating with the United States on the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program, which resulted in several tests of both HGVs and scramjets. Japan is also working on both HGVs and HCMs; the former comes in anti-carrier and area suppression variants and should be deployed between 2024 and 2028. India has been cooperating with Russia on the BrahMos II HCM, and some reports indicate it is also developing an indigenous system of the same type. France has also sought Russian collaboration on hypersonic systems, and is modifying its ASN4G cruise missile to reach hypersonic speeds under the V-max (Experimental Maneuvering Vehicle) program.
The new weapon is possibly meant for nuclear strike. Germany tested the SHEFEX II HGV in 2012, but the government has apparently reduced funding for the program. Finally, other countries have experimented hypersonic technologies, but apparently with no military intent. These include South Korea, Israel, and Iran. It is notable that most of these countries are advanced economies with considerable military concerns, in several cases involving China.
THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF HYPERSONIC MISSILES
The first concern arising from the development and deployment of hypersonic systems is their effect on the nuclear balance. The argument advanced by Russia and China that hypersonic vectors restore equilibrium thanks to their ability to penetrate US missile defenses (that they consider destabilizing) is theoretically valid, but in practice is much weaker. While hypersonic systems are currently impossible to intercept, ordinary missiles are also difficult to destroy in flight and a mass attack would be equally unstoppable. As such, Russia and China’s argument seems more motivated by the need to justify their hypersonic programs, which are to be interpreted in an A2/AD logic. On the opposite side, many believe that hypersonic systems have destabilizing effects due to the impossibility to ascertain whether they carry conventional or nuclear payloads (ambiguity). Yet, this problem is not unique to hypersonic systems, as there are numerous traditional ballistic and cruise missiles affected by the same problem. Therefore, hypersonic missiles do not bring significant changes to nuclear attack capabilities and rather than nuclear vectors they seem mainly conceived as conventional weapons to deliver rapid strikes to critical targets.
Accordingly, it can be concluded that they do not have sensible destabilizing effects per se and do not make war more likely. However, in case of a crisis between great powers sparked by external factors, they may favor an escalatory logic. In such conditions marked by high levels of stress caused by a (perceived) imminent armed threat to vital national interests that leaves little time for response, state-to-state communication deteriorates and decision-makers employ mental shortcuts to quicken their choices, thus making the decision-making process less rational. Under such circumstances, each side may either be tempted to employ hypersonic missiles to launch a rapid and (expectantly) debilitating first strike to - 9 - gain a decisive advantage or to employ its hypersonic assets for a preemptive attack to prevent the opponent from doing so. This would result in a ‘shoot first or lose it’ logic that may lead to an unintended, and possibly nuclear, escalation. In short, hypersonic systems carry the risk of making a crisis more acute, with potentially catastrophic consequences.4 As hypersonic systems exit from the experimental phase and become operational, in the short-medium term they will remain the prerogative of advanced countries possessing the necessary resources, technical infrastructure, and know-how. Yet, they will have to be taken into account by military planners.
If current expectations are met, they will become powerful tools in state military arsenals, but they will also raise the risks of escalation in the event of a crisis. Therefore, their employment should be carefully assessed and should be governed in a crisis management rather than a warfighting logic to avoid an escalation that may degenerate into a major conflict.
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