ISDEI Instituto de Seguridad, Defensa y Estudios Internacionales

Though Australia has prodigious natural gas resources, the country's geology, remoteness and economy have put it in a difficult position in competing financially with other growing natural gas producers. However, timing has been on Canberra's side. The technological revolutions that led other producers such as the United States to increase natural gas production occurred after Australia had begun developing its own expensive resources, so Canberra had a few years' head start in getting large quantities of natural gas to the market. As a result, Australia's liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports will rival the size of Qatar's, allowing it to become the largest exporter to the Asian market by 2020. Yet Australia's continued growth in natural gas exports could cease after the first wave of LNG projects come online, because capital that could be spent on increasing Australia's export capacity now has other, more profitable destinations that did not exist when A

Turkey agreed in principle Sept. 26 to purchase the HQ-9 , a long-range air defense system made by Chinese defense contractor China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp. Turkish President Abdullah Gul has said that the deal is not yet final, and Ankara has since backed away amid pressure from its NATO allies and from Turkish interest groups, but the HQ-9 remains at the top of a very short list of air defense options. The HQ-9 presents several challenges to Ankara. The United States and NATO have warned Turkey repeatedly that because of security issues, the HQ-9 would be difficult to integrate with the rest of Turkey's NATO aligned air defense architecture -- specifically the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment. More important, there are political and security concerns involved in integrating Chinese software and hardware into the network. Should the HQ-9 be excluded from the network, Turkey would have to build up its own independent air defense network. Military equipment must

The Naval Update Map shows the approximate current locations of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups, based on available open-source information. No classified or operationally sensitive information is included in this weekly update. CSGs and ARGs are the keys to U.S. dominance of the world's oceans. A CSG is centered on an aircraft carrier, which projects U.S. naval and air power and supports a Carrier Air Wing, or CVW. The CSG includes significant offensive strike capability. An ARG is centered on three amphibious warfare ships, with a Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked. An MEU is built around a heavily reinforced and mobile battalion of Marines. Carrier Strike Groups The USS Nimitz CSG with Carrier Air Wing 11 embarked is conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR. The USS Harry S Truman CSG with Carrier Air Wing 3 embarked is underway in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR supporting maritime security o

Summary The United States continues to face obstacles in its policy of "pivoting" toward the Asia-Pacific. On Oct. 2, the White House canceled President Barack Obama's visit to Malaysia and the Philippines, slated to take place Oct. 11-12, citing "logistical" difficulties as a result of the partial federal government shutdown. Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman will travel in his stead, while Obama himself will not travel to these countries until a later unspecified date. So far, Obama is still expected to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bali and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders' meeting and East Asia Summit in Brunei from October 7-10, where heads of government will meet. But further cancellations cannot be ruled out. Analysis The cancellation points to Washington's continued trouble finding the capacity to maintain i

Analysis  For centuries, geography and an abundance of domestic resources limited China's need to seek material inputs and project power far beyond its borders. Over the past two decades, however, this dynamic began to break down as China's demand for energy and raw materials outstripped its existing production capacity. As a result, Chinese manufacturers, real estate developers and other businesses found themselves sourcing an increasing share of their energy supplies from overseas, dramatically expanding the Chinese economy's exposure to political and economic forces far beyond the government's control. China has never been more vulnerable -- economically, socially and politically -- to supply disruptions overseas. At the same time, China's supply-demand imbalance has compelled radical changes in the geography and logistics of domestic Chinese resource industries. Most notable has been the rapid migration of energy and raw materials production bases from China&

At the beginning of the year, we outlined how U.S. foreign policy increasingly would be defined by its restraint as the United States attempts to reorient its priorities away from the Middle East. At the same time, we noted that the Syrian chemical weapons issue would be the wild card that would challenge this policy of restraint and compel the United States to cobble together a coalition in haste. That forecast materialized in the third quarter, with the United States trying -- and failing -- to build a coalition for an intervention that it was not particularly enthused about. Both Iran and Russia were quick to seize on the opportunity, and out of the diplomatic fog emerged two aggressive negotiating tracks that will feature prominently in the final months of 2013. Related Links Stratfor's Annual Forecast 2013 Stratfor's Second Quarter Forecast 2013 Stratfor's Third Quarter Forecast 2013 While both Iran and the United States are serious about pursuing a dialogue, the trans

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan reversed the Taliban's takeover in many parts of the country. The resulting geographic shift in support for militant groups led to a degradation of Central Asian militants' capabilities. The Taliban's series of successes ended when the United States invaded Afghanistan following the Sept. 11 attacks by al Qaeda. The U.S. invasion, facilitated by the support of the Northern Alliance and aided by Russia, was able to displace the Taliban and drive the movement from all major cities and towns within a few short months. The invasion included U.S. security support to the Central Asian states that, with help from Moscow, made their territory available for logistical and support bases for U.S. and subsequently NATO operations into Afghanistan. This allowed the Central Asian governments and security forces in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to destroy many militant cells from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other groups, such as H