Summary
With Bolivian President Evo Morales running for a third term in 2014, the government will probably limit efforts to eradicate illegal coca fields in areas where Morales' political support is strong. Since the U.S. State Department stopped cooperating with Bolivian anti-drug operations in August, local security forces have been solely responsible for eradicating illegal coca fields. Destruction of illicit coca has risen in some regions, such as Yungas in western Bolivia, while pressure in the Cochabamba tropics -- where Morales has traditionally enjoyed strong political support -- remains steady. But despite the reduced pressure on certain coca producers, Bolivian cocaine production will not rise significantly if Morales is re-elected unless eradication efforts intensify in neighboring Peru, displacing producers to Bolivia.
Analysis
Bolivia is the third-largest supplier of cocaine to the international drug market. The native plant from which cocaine is derived, coca is widely cultivated in Bolivia's western and central highlands. It is illegal in other South American countries, such as Colombia and Peru, but Bolivia allows government-regulated coca cultivation for medicinal and traditional cultural purposes. However, producers and corrupt government officials also divert legally produced coca toward cocaine production, and numerous illicit coca farms exist alongside legal ones. This ensures a steady supply of coca for Bolivian cocaine manufacturing labs, which are concentrated mostly in the country's eastern lowlands.
Eradication
It is unclear exactly how much of Bolivia's 25,300 hectares of coca are diverted toward cocaine, which remains unlawful in Bolivia. Estimates are generally inaccurate because cocaine labs take both legally and illegally grown coca leaves. However, coca production in Bolivia far exceeds national demand.
Under Bolivian law, the coca that exceeds demand must be destroyed by the government or removed by growers. However, the sale of coca for cocaine production helps support poor farmers, and there is relatively little violence associated with cocaine production in Bolivia. Combined with corruption in the security forces and insufficient resources, the government does not have a great deal of interest in seriously cracking down on illicit coca.
Eradication efforts have historically been concentrated in the Cochabamba tropics, a mountainous jungle region east of La Paz. Until its expulsion from Bolivia in 2008, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration led counternarcotic operations in that region. Although eradication still occurs there, Bolivian police and military officials increasingly target the Yungas region northeast of La Paz.
The nature of Bolivian anti-drug action changed significantly under Morales, who took office in 2006. Originally, most legal coca in Bolivia was grown in Yungas only, so previous Bolivian governments considered most of the coca grown in Cochabamba illegal. Therefore, the DEA targeted coca grown in Cochabamba, particularly in the Chapare region, because it was reportedly used in the manufacture of cocaine. In 1999, DEA operations eliminated 17,000 hectares in Chapare alone. (By comparison, the Morales government destroyed 11,000 hectares nationwide in 2012. Less coca is grown in Bolivia now than in 1999, but eradication is also less concentrated on the known illicit fields of the Cochabamba region.)
Bolivia's government has since accelerated coca eradication outside the Cochabamba region, even though there are existing swathes of illegal coca in that area. According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, illicit coca production in Cochabamba was reduced from about 25,000 metric tons in 2009 to about 21,200 metric tons in 2012. During the same period, illegal production in Yungas and a third region, Norte de la Paz, is estimated to have gone down from about 10,100 metric tons to 5,300 metric tons. It is not clear whether the decrease occurred mostly through eradication or voluntary reduction by planters. The regions have comparable production (22,500 metric tons in Yungas and Norte de la Paz compared to 22,400 metric tons in Cochabamba). However, less than 10 percent of Cochabamba's yield is registered with the government, compared to about 23 percent in Yungas and Norte de la Paz.
Although the destruction of illegal coca continues in Cochabamba, the government may be reluctant to hasten these efforts. Most coca production in the Cochabamba area is controlled by the Six Federations of the Cochabamba Tropics. Morales has been president of this coca growers' group since 1996 and has secured two presidential terms because of financial and political backing from the organization. Faced with a presidential election in December 2014, Morales will likely not crack down on illicit coca in Cochabamba. Bolivian security forces will instead focus on eradication in less politically sensitive areas. For example, police and soldiers eradicated coca in the Norte de la Paz region during October, even though that area produces only 400 metric tons of leaves yearly.
Corrupt officials and inadequate security forces limit the Morales administration's ability to stop illicit coca production. For example, Bolivia's leading coca commercialization official was arrested in September 2013 for allegedly diverting 45 metric tons of legal coca leaves to cocaine producers. The government also lacks enough helicopters to effectively deploy troops to seize cocaine labs, and limited radar coverage means it cannot reliably detect or intercept drug smugglers using airplanes in Bolivian sovereign airspace.
Polls and Future Cocaine Production
Morales faces few political challengers ahead of the elections. An August poll found that 43 percent of voters intended to vote for him in the presidential election -- the highest tally for any candidate. (A separate poll showed that 16 percent of respondents would vote for conservative politician Samuel Doria Medina.) Dissatisfaction within the ruling party may raise votes for the opposition, but Morales' party appears united enough for him to strongly contest and possibly win a third term as president.
Even with another term for Morales, Bolivian cocaine production will likely not grow unless security significantly improves in neighboring Peru. Currently, Peru is the world's largest coca source, with about 60,000 hectares planted. Peru's considerable production resulted from law enforcement pressure that displaced production from Colombia. Similar action in Peru's large coca growing regions could cause Bolivian growers to fill in the gaps. Such action seems unlikely in the short term. Eradicators have reduced coca in Peru's Alto Huallaga region, but production in some parts of southern Peru continues largely unabated.
Over the next year, the Morales administration will not antagonize its political base by taking more action against farmers in Cochabamba. Instead, it will conduct piecemeal operations against growers in other regions whose political support is not as vital.
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