People at a rally supporting Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas on Feb. 26. (RAUL ARBOLEDA/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Venezuela is teetering on the edge of a major political upheaval. Despite the country's large energy reserves, it is facing a shortage of foreign reserves, aggravated by widespread inflation and corruption that has spun beyond the government's control. Basic consumer goods are growing scarce, inflation is at a critically high rate (45 percent according to the central bank, but the true number is likely much higher) and the gap between the official and black market rate for the bolivar is widening.
As a result, Venezuela's typically fractured opposition movement is now widening its base, pulling in a growing number of Venezuelans who are simply fed up with living under economically volatile conditions and coping with high rates of violent crime. With Venezuela bracing for more violent protests, a quiet but potentially significant mediation effort led by former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Uruguayan President Jose Mujica is underway to try to defuse the crisis.
Analysis
Recent rumors have hinted at possible preparations for a coup within the regime of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. But there is no dominant faction to take control of the regime; by design, late President Hugo Chavez surrounded himself with largely uncharismatic leaders, each burdened by their own weaknesses, whether it was the image of being a puppet for the Cubans, a reputation for being grossly corrupt or an inability to inspire loyalty among the masses (or at least within the armed forces). The lack of a strong alternative leader in the ranks raises the potential for any coup attempt to result in a long and violent struggle for power.
Click to Enlarge
Neither the regime nor the Venezuelan public welcomes this scenario. Nor do many of Venezuela's neighbors, who do not want to see an economic, political and social implosion in the country create problems for the rest of the region. Brazil and Argentina are likely to face more protests in the coming months, too, and are not interested in Venezuela's political protests informing protest leaders elsewhere on the continent.
The United States also is not interested in such an outcome. Washington is seeking stability in Venezuela and defines that stability as a government that is able to ideologically part ways with certain Chavismo principles, integrate the opposition and accept foreign energy investment. In other words, from the U.S. point of view, an understanding must be negotiated between Chavez's successors and Venezuela's opposition leaders, who represent a more U.S.- and business-friendly approach to managing the economy.
A Neutral Negotiator
The question then is who could mediate such an understanding in Caracas? The United States is out of the question: Any involvement by Washington will feed conspiracies of the United States returning to its Cold War habits of coup-plotting in Latin America. The United States has much bigger priorities that will keep it from getting involved too deeply in Venezuela. A neutral negotiator is needed, and it appears that at least two Latin American leaders have stepped up to the challenge.
Da Silva and Mujica, who both belong to the moderate left camp in Latin America, have a close and long-standing political and personal relationship. Moreover, Mujica and da Silva have maintained close relationships with Cuba, the traditional Caribbean lynchpin to Chavez's, and now Maduro's, regime. The two leaders have shown a penchant for mediation as well. Mujica, formerly a member of the Tupamaros left-wing guerrilla group in Uruguay, made a successful transition into mainstream politics, giving him credibility in facilitating talks between Bogota and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, commonly known as the FARC, and the National Liberation Army. Da Silva, who remains close to the Workers' Party in Brazil, attempted to insert himself as a mediator between Iran and the United States in a partnership with Turkey. That effort was predictably short-lived, but da Silva has been more successful in mediating Paraguay's internal political feuds and in developing a closer relationship between Venezuela and the Southern Cone countries through the expansion of Mercosur.
Over the past few days, Da Silva and Mujica have attended meetings throughout the region that have very likely covered the developments in Venezuela. Mujica was in Cuba on Feb. 3, where he met with FARC representatives as well as Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. On Feb. 17, Mujica and da Silva met in Montevideo. In a scheduled visit beginning Feb. 18, Uruguayan Foreign Minister Luis Almagro went to the United States, where the issue of Venezuela likely came up in discussions. On Feb. 21, the president of Venezuela's opposition Social-Christian Copei party, Roberto Enriquez, formally appealed to the Uruguayan Embassy in Caracas for Mujica to mediate the crisis in Venezuela. Enriquez argued that the communication channels between rival factions in Venezuela were insufficient and international facilitation was needed. Most recently, da Silva made an urgent visit to Havana to discuss the Venezuelan crisis with Cuban President Raul Castro. Maduro is also scheduled to make a state visit to Uruguay and Argentina in mid-March.
Secondary Players
Cuba and the United States are secondary, yet significant, players in this crisis. Chavez intended for Cuba's deep integration in the Venezuelan regime and military to serve as an insurance policy against potential coup threats. By outsourcing his internal security to the Cubans, the Venezuelan leader had a useful tool to quickly deal with emerging threats to his power. But that strategy has weakened in post-Chavez Venezuela. Maduro, who has a close relationship with the Castro brothers, is evidently dealing with multiple challenges from within the regime in addition to protesters on the streets. Moreover, his policy of maintaining a heavy Cuban presence in the regime and armed forces has hardened long-simmering discontent among Venezuelans who regard such policies as invasive and degrading to Venezuelan sovereignty. A redefinition of Cuba's relationship with Venezuela is a likely outcome of this crisis, and part of da Silva and Mujica's mission will be to try to manage this evolution.
Should the political orientation in Caracas shift, Cuba will have extra incentive to try to redefine its long-hostile relationship with the United States. The United States, while keeping its distance from the crisis, is keen on normalizing relations with a willing government in Caracas. Venezuelan opposition leaders Henrique Capriles and Leopoldo Lopez have developed relationships with the United States and have been open about their interest in seeing Venezuela rehabilitate its relationship with its northern neighbor.
This may well be a condition in the fitful negotiations the Maduro government is attempting with the opposition. Maduro has in fact called for the restoration of ambassadors between the United States and Venezuela. Notably, Maduro has already proposed to give the post to Maximilian Arvelaez, who served as Venezuela's deputy chief of mission to Brazil from August 2007 to January 2008 and was promoted to ambassador to Brazil in March 2010, a period overlapping with da Silva's presidential term. Da Silva and Mujica may be doing their part to facilitate the normalization between the United States and Venezuela as part of an unfolding negotiation among rival factions in Caracas.
It remains to be seen whether da Silva and Mujica can negotiate a resolution to Venezuela's political crisis. The crisis, after all, stems from much deeper structural ailments born out of Chavismo policies that would be difficult and extremely painful to reverse, no matter who is in power. Da Silva and Mujica are credible negotiators to attempt a settlement between Maduro and his political rivals, but the success of any negotiation depends on what direction the popular protests in Venezuela take. For now, the protests are not growing, though clashes continue in the streets. However, if significant violence occurs, it could create too large a divide between the political leadership, opposition leaders and the protesters.
For now, the overwhelming constraints on each of Venezuela's political players are leading all to seek mediation. Uruguay has the neutrality and Brazil has the developing influence to collectively give it a shot. There is no guarantee for success, but the diplomatic initiative does bear close attention.
Comments
Post a Comment