Emergency personnel at the scene of the bombings in Beirut on Feb. 19. (-/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
The leaders of Hezbollah and of the moderate Sunni political parties both want a truce, but the militant groups responsible for a string of attacks in Lebanon may have strayed too far to be reined in. Attacks have grown more frequent -- the most recent, a double bombing in Beirut on Feb. 19, killed five and wounded more than 100 -- but there is no clear increase in their magnitude or sophistication. This lack of progress is likely the result of shortcomings in the attackers' planning and surveillance. The attacks still generate some psychological pressure, but they do not inflict the devastating physical damage the Sunni groups intend. Nevertheless, Hezbollah is striving to do more to neutralize the threat.
Analysis
Suicide bombers detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices during morning rush hour Feb. 19 in Beirut's southern suburbs near the Iranian Chancellery. Pictures of the aftermath and information from contacts in the area suggest the blasts occurred just short of the Iranian office. The devices combined reportedly weighed about 150 kilograms (330 pounds) and inflicted significant casualties while damaging nearby buildings. But given the amount of damage, these estimates may be too large.
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The Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility shortly after the attack. The group has ties to al Qaeda, receives funding from Gulf donors and has a membership consisting of Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians, among others. The brigades have conducted other attacks against Iranian interests in Hezbollah strongholds in the past, most recently bombing the Iranian Embassy in Beirut on Nov. 19. The Feb. 19 attack was not as operationally successful as the one in November, but it shows that the group is still capable of launching attacks within Lebanon despite the capture and death of one of its senior military leaders, a Saudi national by the name of Majid al-Majid.
Other Sunni extremist groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Jabhat al-Nusra, have also carried out bombings inside Lebanon. These groups have made it clear that they will continue to launch attacks against Iranian interests and Hezbollah inside Lebanon in response to Hezbollah's participation in the Syrian civil war and Iran's support for the Syrian regime.
But having the intent and capability to attack is not always enough. The Sunni militant groups' attacks are frequently flawed operationally, and they seem unable to get their explosive devices to the desired attack sites. This stands in stark contract to Hezbollah, which is normally able to hit its targets. There does not appear to be a problem procuring enough fighters or bombers or the necessary explosives, materials and bombmaking expertise -- all of these are readily available due to the fighting in Syria. Instead, the shortcomings are due to a weakness in the planning process, a critical phase in the terrorist attack cycle. The Sunni fighters appear to struggle particularly with preoperational surveillance.
Lebanese and Hezbollah forces have bolstered security and are specifically looking for surveillance activity, and as a result it seems groups such as the Abdullah Azzam Brigades have been unable to freely conduct preoperational surveillance in Hezbollah strongholds. In the past few months there have been several reports of security forces busting operatives planning attacks in Shiite areas. Without adequate surveillance, preparation is often flawed. The result is bombings that fail to get in proximity to their targets. The attacks still have a psychological effect, just not the intended physical effects.
The efforts of Hezbollah and the Lebanese armed forces have prevented higher casualties and damage, but Hezbollah wants to neutralize these threats as much as possible. Hezbollah's desire to work with moderate Sunni leaders to reach a truce with Sunni jihadists was one of the driving factors for its efforts to help form a Cabinet -- a goal that was finally achieved Feb. 15. A truce will not be easily obtained, though both sides want a reduction in violence and instability.
Even in the event of a truce between the leaders, the people behind the attacks have adopted extremist ideologies in the absence of strong and united Sunni leadership in Lebanon. The amount of leverage Sunni leaders have over these groups is questionable. Threatening the groups' funding from Gulf donors may not even be enough. There are likely enough militants committed to the cause to forge ahead with whatever resources they can muster to stage attacks in Lebanon.
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