Chinese paramilitary officers in front of the Urumqi train station May 1.(Reuters)
Summary
At 7 p.m. on the evening of April 30, a bomb detonated in the midst of a crowd leaving the south train station in Urumqi, the capital of China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Information on the incident is limited, but initial reports suggest three people were killed and some 79 were injured in the attack.
The attack was simple and conducted against a soft target. A number of actors could be responsible, from organized groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement to a lone wolf. Attacks such as this are nearly impossible to prevent if Uighur militants have the manpower and will to carry them out.
The attack was simple and conducted against a soft target. A number of actors could be responsible, from organized groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement to a lone wolf. Attacks such as this are nearly impossible to prevent if Uighur militants have the manpower and will to carry them out.
Analysis
While official reports have been scarce, photos from the scene published on various Internet sites allow us to draw some analytical conclusions. First, the photographs make it clear that the device was small and likely simple in construction. It looks like it may have been a pipe bomb-style device manufactured with low-explosive filler. The available photos do not show enough detail to determine whether shrapnel such as nails or ball bearings was added to the device, but it is not unusual for such a device to include extra shrapnel -- as seen in the those used in the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013.
Also, as demonstrated by the Boston bombing, even a simple device using low-explosive filler can be devastating if detonated in the midst of a crowd, which it appears it was, judging from the suitcases and other items dropped at the scene by the victims. We still do not know how the device was delivered. The apparent location of the explosion -- in the middle of a walkway -- would not seem to lend itself well to a device that was left and then detonated as in Boston, so the it may have been carried into the crowd by a suicide bomber, although the attacker could have dropped it and run away.
The fact that the device was detonated outside of the train station's security perimeter and not inside the station or aboard a train, where it would have resulted in more casualties, suggests that the attack's planners did not think they could penetrate the station's security. That they chose the exit rather than the main entrance could indicate that there was less security there. We have seen past attacks at arrival exits at airports in Russia and Germany, so the concept of exits being vulnerable to attack is not new. Uighur militants also conducted a knife attack at the train station in Kunming on March 1.
Simple pipe bomb or pressure cooker devices are easy to assemble and do not require an advanced degree of bombmaking tradecraft. In general, commercial explosives are easier to obtain than firearms in China, and low explosives are easy to obtain in a country with a predilection for fireworks. Simple attacks using readily available items including knives, clubs and gasoline are a staple of the methods employed by Uighur militants in China. Such attacks are very difficult to prevent, especially when they are planned and conducted by small cells or by individuals.
The security environment has deteriorated in the autonomous region over the past two years, and the security risks now extend beyond Xinjiang's borders. A few trends have emerged from the latest attacks: First, most of the attacks target local security forces and soft targets including small businesses and individual Han Chinese who are seen by militants as exploiting the Uighur homeland. Second, instead of well-organized terrorist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, these attacks are carried out primarily by local, family-run criminal gangs and self-motivated grassroots militants that are ideologically inspired by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, but are not directly linked to the group. Third, recent attacks have been carried out outside of Xinjiang, in high-profile locales -- such as the operation in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in November 2013 -- and in more unexpected locations, such as the massacre at the Kunming railway station. Uighur Islamic militants seem thus to have extended their reach, and militants also seem to have shifted their tactics to target masses of civilians and localities of little importance, spurring an escalation of anti-terrorism preparations across the country.
This was therefore the backdrop of Xi's visit to southern Xinjiang: An exacerbated security environment and an increase in separatist activities and ethnic tensions on one side, and on the other, Beijing's accelerated economic, political and energy push westward. Unlike the more developed north, southern Xinjiang -- which includes Kashgar, Hotian and the Aksu-centered Tarim Basin -- has long been marked by severe underdevelopment and weak centralized control. The region has been seen as a haven for separatists and militant activities and has served as a corridor for external infiltration in recent decades.
While in Kashgar, Xi underscored the government's resolution as it prioritizes the fight against terrorism, saying Beijing would build what he called a "wall of bronze and iron." Beijing also hopes that economic development could shrink the space where ethnic tensions, separatism and militant activities take hold. Beijing's aims have been put into evidence by major infrastructure projects and links, favorable investment policies and the establishment of a special economic zone in Kashgar. But these approaches have aroused anger and suspicion among ethnic Uighurs and have encouraged the emergence of radical elements among them, particularly with their oversea connections, such as the Uighur diaspora linked to al Qaeda and other jihadist groups, further undermining Beijing's efforts to pacify Xinjiang.
As Beijing's economic, political and energy attention has shifted westward, Xinjiang's location, resources and the access it provides to Central Asian states are making the region increasingly vital to Beijing's long-term strategic imperatives and energy security. In that sense, the latest attack in Urumqi again highlighted the manifold challenges to Beijing's efforts to secure the buffer region.
Also, as demonstrated by the Boston bombing, even a simple device using low-explosive filler can be devastating if detonated in the midst of a crowd, which it appears it was, judging from the suitcases and other items dropped at the scene by the victims. We still do not know how the device was delivered. The apparent location of the explosion -- in the middle of a walkway -- would not seem to lend itself well to a device that was left and then detonated as in Boston, so the it may have been carried into the crowd by a suicide bomber, although the attacker could have dropped it and run away.
The fact that the device was detonated outside of the train station's security perimeter and not inside the station or aboard a train, where it would have resulted in more casualties, suggests that the attack's planners did not think they could penetrate the station's security. That they chose the exit rather than the main entrance could indicate that there was less security there. We have seen past attacks at arrival exits at airports in Russia and Germany, so the concept of exits being vulnerable to attack is not new. Uighur militants also conducted a knife attack at the train station in Kunming on March 1.
Simple pipe bomb or pressure cooker devices are easy to assemble and do not require an advanced degree of bombmaking tradecraft. In general, commercial explosives are easier to obtain than firearms in China, and low explosives are easy to obtain in a country with a predilection for fireworks. Simple attacks using readily available items including knives, clubs and gasoline are a staple of the methods employed by Uighur militants in China. Such attacks are very difficult to prevent, especially when they are planned and conducted by small cells or by individuals.
A Deterioration in Security
Notably, the attack came as Chinese President Xi Jinping made a high-profile visit to southern Xinjiang. Xi's visit highlighted Beijing's two-part emphasis in the region -- to elevate its anti-terrorism efforts and to expand economic outreach to southern Xinjiang. It is unclear whether the attack in Urumqi was intended to send a message amid Xi's visit, but it reminded Beijing of the challenges it faces as China attempts to secure the resource-rich non-Han buffer region.The security environment has deteriorated in the autonomous region over the past two years, and the security risks now extend beyond Xinjiang's borders. A few trends have emerged from the latest attacks: First, most of the attacks target local security forces and soft targets including small businesses and individual Han Chinese who are seen by militants as exploiting the Uighur homeland. Second, instead of well-organized terrorist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, these attacks are carried out primarily by local, family-run criminal gangs and self-motivated grassroots militants that are ideologically inspired by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, but are not directly linked to the group. Third, recent attacks have been carried out outside of Xinjiang, in high-profile locales -- such as the operation in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in November 2013 -- and in more unexpected locations, such as the massacre at the Kunming railway station. Uighur Islamic militants seem thus to have extended their reach, and militants also seem to have shifted their tactics to target masses of civilians and localities of little importance, spurring an escalation of anti-terrorism preparations across the country.
This was therefore the backdrop of Xi's visit to southern Xinjiang: An exacerbated security environment and an increase in separatist activities and ethnic tensions on one side, and on the other, Beijing's accelerated economic, political and energy push westward. Unlike the more developed north, southern Xinjiang -- which includes Kashgar, Hotian and the Aksu-centered Tarim Basin -- has long been marked by severe underdevelopment and weak centralized control. The region has been seen as a haven for separatists and militant activities and has served as a corridor for external infiltration in recent decades.
While in Kashgar, Xi underscored the government's resolution as it prioritizes the fight against terrorism, saying Beijing would build what he called a "wall of bronze and iron." Beijing also hopes that economic development could shrink the space where ethnic tensions, separatism and militant activities take hold. Beijing's aims have been put into evidence by major infrastructure projects and links, favorable investment policies and the establishment of a special economic zone in Kashgar. But these approaches have aroused anger and suspicion among ethnic Uighurs and have encouraged the emergence of radical elements among them, particularly with their oversea connections, such as the Uighur diaspora linked to al Qaeda and other jihadist groups, further undermining Beijing's efforts to pacify Xinjiang.
As Beijing's economic, political and energy attention has shifted westward, Xinjiang's location, resources and the access it provides to Central Asian states are making the region increasingly vital to Beijing's long-term strategic imperatives and energy security. In that sense, the latest attack in Urumqi again highlighted the manifold challenges to Beijing's efforts to secure the buffer region.
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