Summary
Finnish EU Minister Alexander Stubb, who is likely to be appointed prime minister in the coming days, said June 14 that his country should join NATO. This comes amid an ongoing debate over the future of Finland, a country that has put military nonalignment at the core of its foreign policy. The debate highlights the extent to which the events in Ukraine are having a political and psychological effect on the line of countries from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea that traditionally have been caught in the conflict between Russia and the West.
While there is room for greater cooperation between Finland and NATO, Helsinki is unlikely to formally join NATO any time soon. In the coming years Finland will remain particularly interested in cooperating with its main regional partners in Nordic Europe, especially Sweden.
Analysis
Finland is the quintessential borderland state, surrounded by powerful neighbors, and the Finns have spent the past 10 centuries worried about events to their east and west. Between the late 13th and the early 19th centuries, Finland was under Swedish control. After a Russo-Swedish war, the Grand Duchy of Finland was created in the early 19th century as a relatively autonomous part of the Russian empire. Finland took advantage of the Russian revolution to declare independence in 1917, with support from Germany. But the young nation had to fight to remain independent during World War II, first against the Russians and then against the Nazis. Finland's complex role during the war reveals a country in permanent struggle to find a balance between its powerful neighbors. Finland was never a formal member of the Axis but saw an alliance with the Nazis as vital to preventing a Russian invasion. When it became clear that the Germans were losing the war, the Finns had to switch gears again and seek accommodation with the Russians.
This balancing act became particularly difficult during the Cold War, when Finland was caught in the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. Helsinki understood that to remain independent it also had to remain neutral. By maintaining a distant relationship with NATO and taking a neutral position on Moscow's foreign policy, Finland also managed to fend off Soviet pressure to join the Warsaw Pact. There was a silent understanding between Finland and Russia, according to which Finland could remain a capitalist and independent nation as long as it chose not to confront Moscow. This gave birth to the concept of "Finlandization," which is to this day used to describe the decision of a country to come to an accommodation with a stronger neighbor as a means of maintaining national sovereignty.
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Finlandization was based on the purest form of realpolitik, and in the long run it enabled Finland to protect its national sovereignty in the face of both Russia and the West. With the end of the Cold War, it looked like Finlandization was a thing of the past. The Russians were disoriented and on the verge of collapse, and the Finns considered it a good time for a rapprochement with the West. Thus, Helsinki joined the European Union in 1995 along with two other nations that had remained neutral during the Cold War: Sweden and Austria.
Even though EU accession brought Finland considerably closer to the West, NATO membership remains extremely controversial. Finland participates in NATO's Partnership for Peace program and has contributed peacekeeping forces to missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Several Finnish politicians have expressed support for NATO membership, but most parties are still divided on the issue. Even Finnish President Sauli Niinisto, who has voiced support for NATO accession, recently stated that such a decision would require a national referendum. Most opinion polls indicate that the majority of Finns oppose joining NATO.
The Ukraine Effect
The events in Ukraine have reignited Finland's traditional fears of an expansionist Russia. The debate on whether to join NATO will be high on Finland's political agenda, especially as the country's general elections, scheduled for April, draw closer. Nonalignment, however, will remain a defining feature of Finnish foreign policy.
In the coming years, Finland is more likely to deepen its ties with its Nordic partners than to join NATO. The creation of the Nordic Defense Cooperation alliance, which also includes Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland, is an indication of Finland's direction. Finland has very close political ties with Sweden, another non-NATO country, so any moves to get closer to NATO will probably be taken jointly by Helsinki and Stockholm. Like Finland, Sweden is also holding an intense debate over its potential NATO membership, which most Swedes oppose. This will not prevent Finland from cooperating with NATO to some degree -- Helsinki will keep employing NATO procedures and participating in some of the alliance's exercises and missions.
Potential Finlandization Elsewhere in the Region
The debate over Finlandization comes amid the crisis in Ukraine -- a standoff that could result in the neutralization of Ukraine in an understanding between Russia and the West. Such an agreement might allow Ukraine to trade with Europe and sign political agreements with Brussels as long as it does not join NATO. But because of Ukraine's key position in Eastern Europe, both parties will remain considerably more involved in events in Kiev than they were in those in Helsinki during the Cold War. As a result, the balance will always be more fragile and more volatile in Ukraine than in Finland.
Even if Finland's foreign policy is unlikely to change dramatically, the Finnish EU minister's statements highlight the degree to which the events in Ukraine have had a political and emotional impact in the European borderlands. Thanks to refined political craftsmanship, Finland has managed to preserve its independence for almost a century. This was not the case for many nations in Central and Eastern Europe, which after the war fell under Russia's direct or indirect control and are now becoming increasingly nervous about Moscow's potential moves.
For the largest countries in the region, most notably Poland and Romania, the events in Ukraine mean that they have to strengthen the military alliances with each other and with the United States. Smaller countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria are looking for some kind of balance of their own, in which they seek a delicate equilibrium between Moscow and Brussels. This will remain a definitive feature of the "Little Cold War" that Europe will face in the coming years.
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