Click to Enlarge
The Shiite-dominated Iraqi state has weakened to the point where Tehran will have to depend on Shiite militias to protect its interests across the Iraqi border. When Iran's Shiite proxies consolidated control over Iraq after the U.S. invasion, Tehran took comfort in the weakening of the Sunnis, the minority community that had dominated Iraq since 1920. However, Tehran has been concerned about a potential Sunni revival, especially since the Arab Spring in Syria metastasized into a full-scale civil war and regional sectarian conflict. If Syria fell to the Sunnis, Tehran's allied regime in Baghdad would be threatened and Iran could again face a major threat on its western border.
Iran's sense of relief about preventing the collapse of the Alawite regime in Damascus shattered earlier this month when Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant militants surged in Iraq. The offensive likely came as a surprise, since the Sunnis in Syria had been contained and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant was tied up in fighting not only the Syrian regime but also nearly every other rebel force in Syria. Iran has always had a contingency plan for dealing with any threats to its Shiite allies in Baghdad, one that relies largely on Iraqi state security forces and, if necessary, Shiite militias. Iraqi security forces have been stretched thin for quite some time, and their retreat from Mosul shows that Tehran will likely need to bolster the security forces with help from militias. However, this approach has problems because many large militias in Iraq, such as the Mehdi Army, have dissolved. The Iranians have maintained some militias that can be activated, but the current situation requires a far larger mobilization of militiamen on a communal level. Using these militias could help to repel the militant forces but will come at a cost, since it may undermine central control in Baghdad.
The Shia and Iran are not without allies among the Iraqi Sunnis, who do not want to counter Shiite domination by accepting jihadist domination. But these direct contacts alone will not be sufficient. Iran will need to work with Turkey, which is threatened by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant on two of its borders. The Turks have ties to Iraq's Sunnis, and in recent years they have also developed relations with the Kurds. In addition, Tehran can coordinate with the United States, which has also pledged support to the al-Maliki government and has influence among the Sunnis. Thus, Iran's strategy will require synchronizing its regional resources with those of other state actors.
The Shiite-dominated Iraqi state has weakened to the point where Tehran will have to depend on Shiite militias to protect its interests across the Iraqi border. When Iran's Shiite proxies consolidated control over Iraq after the U.S. invasion, Tehran took comfort in the weakening of the Sunnis, the minority community that had dominated Iraq since 1920. However, Tehran has been concerned about a potential Sunni revival, especially since the Arab Spring in Syria metastasized into a full-scale civil war and regional sectarian conflict. If Syria fell to the Sunnis, Tehran's allied regime in Baghdad would be threatened and Iran could again face a major threat on its western border.
Iran's sense of relief about preventing the collapse of the Alawite regime in Damascus shattered earlier this month when Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant militants surged in Iraq. The offensive likely came as a surprise, since the Sunnis in Syria had been contained and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant was tied up in fighting not only the Syrian regime but also nearly every other rebel force in Syria. Iran has always had a contingency plan for dealing with any threats to its Shiite allies in Baghdad, one that relies largely on Iraqi state security forces and, if necessary, Shiite militias. Iraqi security forces have been stretched thin for quite some time, and their retreat from Mosul shows that Tehran will likely need to bolster the security forces with help from militias. However, this approach has problems because many large militias in Iraq, such as the Mehdi Army, have dissolved. The Iranians have maintained some militias that can be activated, but the current situation requires a far larger mobilization of militiamen on a communal level. Using these militias could help to repel the militant forces but will come at a cost, since it may undermine central control in Baghdad.
The Shia and Iran are not without allies among the Iraqi Sunnis, who do not want to counter Shiite domination by accepting jihadist domination. But these direct contacts alone will not be sufficient. Iran will need to work with Turkey, which is threatened by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant on two of its borders. The Turks have ties to Iraq's Sunnis, and in recent years they have also developed relations with the Kurds. In addition, Tehran can coordinate with the United States, which has also pledged support to the al-Maliki government and has influence among the Sunnis. Thus, Iran's strategy will require synchronizing its regional resources with those of other state actors.
Comments
Post a Comment